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ABSTRACT 
 
“Welcome to the Golden Land” is the phrase which greets visitors arriving at the International 
Airport of Rangoon, the capital of Burma. A country of extreme richness from the cultural and 
environmental points of view, Burma, now officially called Myanmar, is a paradise for tourists, being 
one of the last countries of Asia still offering an insight of traditional Indochina. But many tourists 
maybe are unaware that the country could preserve its typical oriental charm as a consequence of the 
isolation policy established by one of the worst and longest lasting military dictatorships in the world. 
 
In the present work it will be shown how the high incidence of Sexual and Gender-Based 
Violence (SGBV) in Burma is one of the leading factors determining the flight of hundreds of 
thousands of women into Thailand and how the Thai Government policy towards refugees from Burma 
does not provide them with adequate protection, but, on the contrary, often exposes them to further 
violations of their basic rights. 
 
The importance of the accession of Thailand to the United Nations Convention on the Status of 
Refugees in order to increase the safety of women crossing the border to seek protection from the 
repression of the Burmese army will be highlighted. This step should be further strengthened by the 
elaboration of a refugee status determination policy which takes into account SGBV as a ground to 
grant asylum. Besides, the Burmese junta should hand over the government to a truly democratic 
administration which should elaborate effective projects aimed at enhancing gender equality within the 
country.  
 
It is further underlined the importance of the involvement of the international community in the 
effort to stop the massive violations of women‟s rights enacted in an environment of total impunity by 
the military junta which has been ruling Burma since the 1960s. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Welcome to the Golden Land” is the phrase which greets visitors arriving at the International 
Airport of Rangoon, the capital of Burma. A country of extreme richness from the cultural and 
environmental points of view, Burma, now officially called Myanmar, is a paradise for tourists, being 
one of the last countries of Asia still offering an insight of traditional Indochina. But many tourists 
maybe are unaware that the country could preserve its typical oriental charm as a consequence of the 
isolation policy established by one of the worst and longest lasting military dictatorships in the world. 
Its landscape dotted with hundreds of golden pagodas, has been the theatre of a bloody decades-
long civil war between the central government and ethnic insurgents which has resulted in the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians forced to flee from the draconian strategy of 
repression enacted from the army ruling the country. Refugees from Burma crossed the borders of all 
the neighbouring countries, but the largest number sought refuge in Thailand.  
As in every ethnic conflict, civilians are the main target of the atrocities committed by both the 
regular army and the insurgents following a pattern common in other civil wars, women are extremely 
vulnerable and subjected to countless violations of their basic rights, ranging from the widespread use 
of rape as a strategy of ethnic cleansing, to the denial of their economic, social and cultural rights, to 
the obligation to serve as porters for the army and forced labourers for infrastructural projects. These 
gross violations of women‟s rights and the conditions in which the civilian population of Burma is 
obliged to live are attested to by many reports elaborated by local and international NGOs and are well-
known to the United Nations, even if the situation of the country has been discussed only once, thus 
far, in front of the Security Council. 
The conditions of women refugees from Burma in Thailand are characterised by an ongoing 
situation of vulnerability deriving in part from the attitude of the Thai government towards people 
searching for refuge in its territory. Thailand, in fact, is not party to the United Nations Convention on 
the Status of Refugees or to its 1967 Protocol; therefore the majority of persons who have been obliged 
to cross the border by the repression suffered within Burma is considered to be illegally present in the 
country, and thus face a high risk of forced repatriation or other violations of their basic rights.  
The particular risks characterizing the life of displaced women have been subjected to 
increasing attention by international organizations since the 1980s: UNHCR issued numerous 
documents aimed at improving the livelihood of women refugees by establishing tools for their 
protection from the different forms of sexual and gender-based violence to which they can be subjected 
 7 
during every phase of the displacement cycle. Notwithstanding the clear engagement of UNHCR and 
other relief agencies with regard to the rights of displaced women, their conditions world-wide still 
give reasons of worry, in particular in the non-Convention environments such as Thailand and all the 
countries bordering with Burma.  
 
The aim of the present work is to give an overview of the conditions of women refugees from 
Burma in Thailand and of the main reasons pushing them to flee from their home country. The main 
purpose is to demonstrate the responsibility of the Burmese junta in the widespread and systematic 
violation of women‟s rights, which directly contradicts its official position according to which women 
in Burma fully enjoy their rights and are not subjected to any form of violence. In addition, the policy 
of the Thai government towards refugees will be analysed in order to highlight its consequences on 
women refugees and its inconsistency with the norms of customary international law, in particular the 
principle of non-refoulement. The reason why the analysis is going to be based exclusively on Thailand 
is the large number of persons that, fleeing from the Burmese military regime, looked for refuge in this 
particular country. 
 
The present paper is divided into two parts: while the first part aims at giving an overview of 
international refugee law and the framework elaborated in order to increase the protection accorded to 
women refugees, the second part focuses on an analysis of the conditions of women in Burma prior to 
their flight into Thailand and then in displaced settings in the host country. Due to the recent 
implementation of projects specifically aimed at enhancing women refugees‟ livelihood in Thailand, it 
is impossible in the present work to evaluate their impact; nevertheless, this paper provides the 
necessary analytical instruments to assess their future consequences and shows at least a theoretical 
consistency between the policies and guidelines elaborated by UNHCR and the projects developed 
within the refugee communities of Thailand. 
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Refugees without a Camp 
 
The regime's soldiers advance. 
 
They kill our animals, take our rice. 
 
From our schools they take the learning and light. 
 
They burn our villages and steal our minds. 
 
We hear the soldiers’ voice, and we are filled with fear and hate. 
 
And we must run, run, run, until our legs break, 
 
Refugees without a home, without a camp. 
 
They dress our Buddhas in women’s underwear. 
 
We see our people floating bloated in the river. 
 
We have land but cannot farm it, forced labour is our lot. 
 
“Peace, peace, peace”, they say. Burma says we are at peace. 
 
But we are not. We hear gunshots night and day. 
 
And we must run, run, run, until our legs break, 
 
Refugees without a home, without a camp. 
 
Some Shan live in Thailand, work as servants or as slaves, 
 
Some live in relocation camps, without money, food, or hope. 
 
Some live in the jungle and hear their dying child’s cries, 
 
Mosquitoes on their limbs, and leeches in their eyes. 
 
They dig a shallow grave and place the child inside, 
 
And then they must run, run, run, until their legs break, 
 
Refugees without a home, without a camp. 
 
- From The Shan Women’s Action Network, “Shan Refugees: Dispelling the Myths”, original Shan 
language poem by Lenghsim (hsenhoe), English adaptation by Bernice Koehler Johnson- 
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CHAPTER 1: REFUGEE LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION 
 
1. The Institutional Framework of Refugee Law: from the League of 
Nations to UNHCR 
 
Although the term “refugee” has been used for centuries to describe any situation in which a 
person had to flee his or her country of origin, it was only during the 20
th
 century that a particular legal 
system aimed at dealing with people seeking protection in a State other than that of their nationality or 
habitual place of residence was developed.
1
 
Under the auspices of the League of Nations, different multilateral treaties dealing with specific 
groups of refugees were drafted with the aim of defining their legal status.
2
 A binding convention on 
the International Status of Refugees was drafted in 1933, but its application was limited to the refugees 
already existing at that moment, thus, when the political situation prior to the Second World War in 
Germany determined the flight of many opponents to the regime, a new specific treaty had to be 
elaborated. 
It was only with the creation of the United Nations that the international community decided to 
approach the refugee problem as a whole.
3
 In 1947 the responsibility of the refugees defined by the 
multilateral treaties signed under the League of Nations and of wartime displaced persons was assigned 
to the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organisation, replaced in 1948 by a 
temporary agency, the International Refugee Organisation.
4
 In December 1949 a Resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly decided the creation of a High Commissioner‟s Office for Refugees, 
which Statute was approved by resolution one year after.  
According to the Statute, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
which started its activities in January 1951,
5
 has the main duty of providing international protection to 
                                                 
1
 Jahn  Ebehard, Refugees,  in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam, North Holland, 
vol. IV, 2000, p. 72. 
2
 The first of such treaties was signed in 1922 and was related to the status of Russian and Armenian refugees, and was 
followed by others dealing with Assyrian, Chaldean, Kurdish and Turkish refugees (1928) and with refugees from Germany 
in 1938; ibidem, pp. 72-73; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, Guildford, Oxford University Press, 
1996, pp. 5-7.  
3
 Jahn Ebehard, Refugees, cit., p. 72. 
4
 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees, United Nations High Commissioner, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Amsterdam, North Holland, vol. IV, 2000, p. 78. 
5
 Ibidem. 
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and seeking permanent solutions for refugees.
6
 The Statute brought under the responsibility of the new 
agency those refugees whose status had been determined by the pre-war multilateral treaties, the ones 
resulting from events which occurred before the 1
st
 of January 1951 and, finally, any other person that, 
based on a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion, was unable or unwilling to be protected by his or her country of nationality or, if stateless, of 
habitual residence.
7
 
In December 1950 the United Nations General Assembly also decided to convene a conference 
to draft and sign a Convention on the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the 1951 Convention).
8
 The 1951 
Convention‟s definition of a refugee echoes the one given by the UNHCR Statute, but adds the 
membership of a particular social group as grounds for persecution. Moreover, apart from the 
temporary limitation already contained in the Statute, the States participating in the conference had the 
possibility of geographically limiting the scope of application of the Convention to refugees resulting 
from events occurring in Europe prior to January 1951.
9
 While the time-limit was later eliminated by 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the 1967 Protocol),
10
 the possibility of 
limiting the geographic application of the 1951 Convention was maintained. In addition to defining the 
concept of refugee, the 1951 Convention established some minimum standards for the treatment of 
persons falling into the category: the content of these standards will be analysed later in this chapter. 
As of March 2006, the States parties to the Convention amounted to 143, being the most recent 
accession the one of Afghanistan in August 2005.  The States parties to the 1967 Protocol amounted to 
143, while the ones parties to both documents were 140.
11
 
As stated above, one of the main competences of UNHCR is to protect refugees as defined by 
its Statute, a definition that is the same, with the differences above-mentioned, as that provided by 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention. In reality nowadays UNHCR‟s competences encompass several 
activities not included in its Statute, and include beneficiaries that do not fall under the narrow legal 
category of refugee established both by the Statute and the Convention, who are defined with the 
                                                 
6
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 7. 
7
 UNGA res. 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, ibidem, pp. 384-389. 
8
 UNGA res. 429 (V) of 14 December 1950. 
9
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p.19. 
10
 The 1967 Protocol is an independent juridical instrument and states can decide to ratify it without ratifying the 1951 
Convention: in this case, states only have to apply arts. 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention to refugees as defined by art. 1, but 
without the time-limit; ibidem, p. 298.  
11
 UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, at 
www.unhcr.org/states_parties.  
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somewhat vague term of “persons of concern to UNHCR”.12 These enlargements are based on special 
authorisations issued by the United Nations General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and 
the Secretary General, and give UNHCR the necessary flexibility to deal with refugee crisis all over the 
world.
13
 
To understand the extent to which UNHCR‟s competences, in particular in terms of persons 
under its protection, have developed, it is useful to refer to the data presented in the “2004 Global 
Refugee Trends” report issued by the agency in July 2005.14 By the end of 2004, the total population of 
concern to UNHCR
15
 amounted to 19.2 million. Considering that in the same period the total world 
refugee population amounted to 9.2 million, 54% of which is assisted by UNHCR,
16
 these data indicate 
that the agency deals on a growing scale with beneficiaries not falling under the Statute‟s or the 
Convention‟s definition.  Even if the largest category of persons (more than 9 million) assisted by 
UNHCR is still comprised by refugees,
17
 a great amount of it consists of “other persons of concern”, in 
particular the internally displaced (almost 5.5 million).
18
  
Furthermore, in particular starting from the refugee crisis of the 1990s, increasing importance 
has been given to the assistance role of UNHCR. The programmes of the agency were thus “[…] 
extended beyond local integration, employment and self-sufficiency projects, to cover returnees and the 
internally displaced.”19 
This short overview of the development of the institutional framework dealing with refugees at 
the international level gives an idea of the complexity of the refugee phenomenon; it is now necessary 
to more deeply analyse the definition of refugee provided by the main international instruments on the 
subject and the standards that should be applied to people fulfilling the criteria contained by this 
definition. 
 
                                                 
12
 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees…, cit., p. 82. 
13
 Ibidem. 
14 Population and Geographical Data Section Division of Operational Support UNHCR Geneva, 2004 Global Refugee 
Trends: Overview of Refugee Populations, New Arrivals, Durable Solutions, Asylum-Seekers, Statelessness and Other 
Persons of Concern to UNHCR, July 2005, at www.UNHCR.org/STATISTICS.  
15
 The total population of concern to UNHCR includes refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), returned IDPs, and stateless persons; ibidem, paragraph 3. 
16
 Ibidem, paragraphs. 3-5.  
17
 Defined as “persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in 
accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a humanitarian status and those granted temporary protection”, 
ibidem, Table 1, footnote 2. 
18
 Ibidem, Table 1. 
19
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p.218. 
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2. Who is a Refugee? 
 
The definition of refugee is given by Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention. According to this 
article, the term refugee applies to any person who “[…] owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country […]”.20 
It follows that, first, a refugee must be outside of his or her country of nationality or habitual 
residence;
21
 and, in addition, this person has to be unwilling or unable to be protected by his or her 
country of origin due to a well-founded fear of persecution. It must be noted that the relation between 
being outside one‟s country of origin and fearing persecution is not a causal one: a refugee can be 
abroad for reasons not related to persecution, for instance for holidays, and make a claim for asylum 
because of a change in his or her country during his or her absence, and have a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted upon return.
22
  
The element of fear is very difficult to assess as it is a subjective element and requires an 
analysis of the likeliness of a future risk.
23
 For this reason it is of paramount importance while 
evaluating a refugee claim to take into account the overall conditions in the claimant‟s country of 
origin. With regard to persecution, its meaning and contents are defined neither by the 1951 
Convention, nor by any other international instrument.
24
 Of course its core content encompasses threats 
to life and restrictions to freedom when based on the five grounds listed by Article 1A(2), but “[…] a 
wide margin of appreciation is left to States in interpreting this fundamental term, and practice reveals 
no coherent or consistent jurisprudence.”25 Less serious measures likely to affect a claimant, such as, 
for example, restrictions to freedom of speech or economic disadvantages, can amount to persecution 
according to the assessment of different factors, in particular the severity of the measures and the 
relevance of the rights affected by them.
26
 
                                                 
20
 If stateless, this person has to be unwilling or unable to avail himself of the protection of the country of habitual 
residence; see 1951 Convention, art. 1 A (2). 
21
 The essential role plaid by the border-crossing in the definition of refugee can be considered also as a direct consequence 
of the centrality of States in international law; see Catherine Phuong, The International Protection of Internally Displaced 
Persons, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 22.  
22
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 40. 
23
 Ibidem, p. 41. 
24
 Ibidem, p. 66; see also Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees…, cit., p. 80. 
25
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 67. 
26
 Ibidem, p. 68.  
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There is a clear link between protection, or lack of protection, and persecution. It is in fact self-
evident that a lack of protection increases the likeliness of persecution. This link acquires particular 
importance when the persecution is not enacted by state agents, but by entities that the State is not able 
to control or whose activities it tolerates. In these cases it is more difficult for the claimant to establish 
the likeliness of persecution and its nature
27
 and the determination of the absence of protection by the 
State acquires a central importance.  
At any rate, for a claimant to be considered as a refugee, the persecution must be based on the 
grounds listed in Article 1A(2), all of which are linked to the application of the principle of non-
discrimination, as it has developed in general international law and in many human rights 
instruments.
28
  
The ground of “membership of a particular social group” is particularly interesting. As stated 
earlier, this reason leading to persecution is not part of the definition of refugee provided by the 
UNHCR Statute; considering the historical moment in which the Convention was drafted, it is possible 
that the delegates decided to include it considering the persecutions that persons belonging to the 
“capitalist class” were suffering in socialist countries.29 The rationale to single out a particular group is 
the identification of characteristics belonging to an individual at birth (such as gender) as well as others 
deriving from an individual‟s choices (for example his or her economic activity). The potentiality of the 
ground of membership in a particular social group lies in its “[…] element of open-endedness 
potentially capable of expansion in favour of a variety of different classes susceptible to persecution.”30  
States party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are in charge of assessing the 
existence of the aforementioned elements when determining the status of an applicant: in the case the 
claimant fulfils the criteria listed by Article 1A(2) of the Convention, he or she will be considered as a 
“Convention refugee”; at the other end, UNHCR has the responsibility of assessing the status 
considering not only the definition contained by its Statute, but also the United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions, which have contributed to a relevant increase in the number of persons of 
concern to the agency. In this case the applicant would be considered a “mandate refugee”. What is 
important to emphasize is that when an individual makes a claim for refugee status in a country which 
is not party to the Convention or the Protocol he or she can still be defined as a mandate refugee if his 
                                                 
27
 Ibidem, pp. 70-73. 
28
 Ibidem, pp. 43, 68. 
29
 Ibidem, p. 46. 
30
 Ibidem, p. 48. 
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or her conditions fulfil the requirements of UNHCR‟s Statute or if a resolution of the General 
Assembly is relevant for the case.
31
 
The overlapping of the narrow conventional definition and the enlargement of the number of 
mandate refugees gives States the possibility of restricting their responsibilities in the face of a refugee 
crisis. It is particularly difficult, for example, to distinguish between people fleeing persecution from 
others forced to leave their country because of major economic crisis. This situation can often result in 
the denial of protection for groups in need of it.
32
   
Further problems are created by mass internal displacements: not having crossed a border, 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) do not fulfil one of the basic requirements of the refugee definition 
given by the Convention. Nevertheless, IDPs, whose protection should be granted by their State of 
origin,
33
 are often in even worse conditions than refugees-proper. UNHCR started dealing with the 
problem of IDPs in 1972 in relation to Sudan;
34
 in 1992 the United Nations Secretary General 
appointed a Special Representative on IDPs, who issued his first report in 1993.
35
 In any case, the 
international community still deals with IDPs on a case-by-case base and doubts about the necessity of 
their definition as a specific legal category have been expressed both by scholars as well as 
humanitarian organizations.
36
 
To conclude, it is interesting to notice that the enlargement of the refugee definition resulting 
from the General Assembly resolutions has been echoed by regional instruments, in particular the 1984 
Cartagena Declaration in Latin America and the 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa drafted under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. Both regional 
instruments were developed in areas highly affected by mass exodus and, as a consequence, include the 
                                                 
31
 Ibidem, pp. 32-33.  
32
 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Refugees…, cit., p. 80. 
33
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 264. 
34
 Ibidem; see also Nils, Geissler, The International Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, in International Journal of 
Refugee Law, vol. 11, 1999, p. 453.   
35
 Comprehensive Study on the Human Rights Issues relating to Internally Displaced Persons, UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/35; 
the definition of IDPs given by the Special Representative Mr. Deng in his first report was “persons who have been forced 
to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic 
violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who are within the territory of their own country”, cited in 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 265. 
36
 The main argument is that the creation of a new legal category is not needed since IDPs should be protected under 
humanitarian and human rights law; for an overview of this subject see  Nils Geissler, The International Protection of 
Internally Displaced Persons, in “International Journal of Refugee Law”, vol. 11, 1999, pp. 457-458; for the problems 
arising in elaborating a legal definition of IDPs, see Catherine Phuong, The International Protection…, cit., pp. 22-28.    
 16 
flight from situations of generalized violence, such as internal conflicts or mass violation of human 
rights, within the grounds for determining refugee status.
37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit.,  pp. 20-21; see art. 1.2, Organization of African Unity, 1969 Convention on 
the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, and paragraph III.3, 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees; 
interestingly, the definitions of IDPs reflect the ones of refugees given by these two regional instruments, see Nils Geissler, 
The International Protection…, cit., p. 453. 
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3. What Does Being a Refugee Mean? 
 
The rights to which refugees are entitled in the host country are listed in the 1951 Convention. 
The minimum standard required by the Convention is that the treatment of refugees equals the one 
accorded to aliens.
38
 In relation to the right of association, the right to work, the right to a shelter and 
the right to secondary education, the Convention requires States to apply the most favourable treatment 
applied to foreigners under same circumstances,
39
 while for other rights
40
 States should grant refugees 
the same treatment as nationals. 
In addition to the standards applicable to refugees considered as aliens in an unusual status, 
others must be applied to refugees as such. Apart from the articles that attempt to limit the application 
of exceptional measures to refugees as a consequence of their nationality and regulate the extent of the 
limitations to the right to freedom of movement,
41
 articles providing for rights to which refugees as 
such are entitled can be divided between those “[…] under which States parties agree to provide certain 
facilities to refugees; and secondly, those by which States have undertaken to recognize and protect 
certain „rights‟ on behalf of refugees.”42 While the first category is mostly related to administrative 
measures host States are supposed to take to improve refugees‟ day-to-day life, such as the issuing of 
documents and the facilitation of naturalization,
43
 the second is composed of provisions addressing one 
of the main challenges a refugee has to face: repatriation against his or her will. In this regard, Articles 
31 on the illegal entry in a country, 32 on the limitations to expulsion, and 33 on the principle of non-
refoulement are particularly relevant.  
The aim of Article 31 is to draw a line between refugees illegally entering or already present in 
a country and illegal immigrants tout court, stating that, if refugees are fleeing from a country out of 
fear of persecution, they shouldn‟t be subjected to penalties arising from their illegal entry “[…] 
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal 
entry or presence.”44 This article is of paramount importance considering that very often refugees do 
not have the possibility of exhausting the administrative measures required to legally enter the host 
                                                 
38
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 299. 
39
 See 1951 Convention, arts. 15 and 17.1, 21, 22.2. 
40
 See 1951 Convention, arts. 4 (religion), 14 (artistic rights and industrial property), 16 (access to court and legal 
assistance), 20 (rationing), 22.1 (primary education), 23 (public relief), 24.1 (social security), 29 (fiscal charges). 
41
 See 1951 Convention, arts 8, 9 and 26; these provisions have been particularly subjected to reservations since strictly 
related to considerations of national security as explained in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., pp. 299-301. 
42
 Ibidem, p. 301.   
43
 See 1951 Convention, arts. 25 (administrative assistance), 27 (identity documents), 28 (travel documents), 30 (transfer of 
assets) and 34 (facilitation of naturalization).  
44
 1951 Convention, art. 31.1. 
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State that could therefore consider them “illegal immigrants” and apply the relevant provisions of the 
case. At any rate Article 31 states neither the obligation of granting refuge, nor the prohibition to 
temporary restrictions of movement.
45
 
Expulsion of a lawful refugee is ruled by Article 32, according to which such a refugee cannot 
be expelled unless it is demonstrated through a due process of law that he or she constitutes a serious 
threat to national security. Article 32.3 goes further by stating that the State should grant to a refugee 
pending expulsion a reasonable period of time to find another host country.
46
 The problem that may 
arise from this article is that, if a refugee is considered a danger for the current host country, the 
possibility of finding another State willing to grant asylum can prove to be very difficult; at the same 
time, a refugee cannot be repatriated to his or her country of origin if the reasons which determined the 
flight are still present.
47
 
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention deals with non-refoulement, one of the fundamental 
principles undergirding refugee law. The origins of this principle can be traced to the 19
th
 century, even 
if it was only the 1933 Convention on the International Status of Refugees that ultimately included it in 
a binding international instrument.
48
 The principle of non-refoulement prohibits the summary return of 
refugees to any State where they would be at risk of persecution. Its distinguishing element is the 
informality of the procedure of return, which differentiates it from “[…] expulsion or deportation, the 
more formal process whereby a lawfully resident alien may be required to leave a State, or be forcibly 
removed.”49 From the phrasing of article 33.1, it clearly states that the principle applies to every 
refugee, irrespective of the formal definition of his or her status;
50
 nevertheless, refoulement is accepted 
ex article 33.2 in cases in which a refugee can be reasonably regarded as “[…] a danger to the security 
of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by final judgement of a particular serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”51 The second paragraph of Article 33 
                                                 
45
 Restrictions on movements are allowed while the decision on the status of the person illegally entering the country is 
pending; moreover, art. 31.2 specifies that a refugee must be granted a sufficient time to find refuge in another country; see 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., pp. 152-153, 305-306; as it will be analysed in the second part of the present 
work, the consideration of refugees as illegal immigrants is very common in non-Convention environments as it is the case 
in Thailand. 
46
 Art. 32.3 gives the right to States to “[...] apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary”.   
47
 In this case in fact the State would breach the principle of non-refoulement, see below; on expulsion of lawful refugees, 
see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., pp. 151-152, 306-307.  
48
 Ibidem, pp. 117-121. 
49
 Ibidem, p. 117. 
50
 This means that if a person is defined as a “mandate” refugee or a Person of Concern to UNHCR, the principle of non-
refoulement has to be respected by the host country: this remark is particularly important in the case of Thailand that will be 
analysed in the second part of the present work. 
51
 1951 Convention, art. 33.2.  
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allows States a margin of appreciation in the determination of the concepts of danger for national 
security or serious crime. In any case, States must apply the principle of proportionality, assessing the 
seriousness of the threat constituted by the refugee in relation to the consequences of his or her return 
to a possibly unsafe country.
52
 
The principle of non-refoulement can be considered part of customary law, thus also binding 
States not parties to the 1951 Convention.
53
 The evidence of the inclusion of the principle in the corpus 
of international general law is given by States‟ practice, together with the one of international 
organizations.
54
 Furthermore, non-refoulement has been included in many international treaties and 
documents not exclusively or directly related to refugees, both at universal and regional levels, such as 
the United Nations Convention against Torture.
55
 When States express doubts on the legal binding 
value of the principle, it is usually in relation to mass influxes of refugees that could undermine their 
national security; nevertheless, these situations can be considered as falling under the exceptions to the 
principle.
56
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 Ibidem, pp. 139-141. 
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 See, for example, the paper prepared in occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 1951 Convention by  the UNHCR 
Department of International Protection , The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee and its 1967 Protocol: 
Signing On Could Make the Difference, 2001, p. 7, at www.unhcr.org. 
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 As Goodwin-Gill points out, UN General Assembly resolutions adopting UNHCR‟s reports are taken by consensus, 
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and in summary records”, but no objection, either formal or informal, on non-refoulement has ever been expressed; see Guy 
S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., pp. 167-168.  
55
 See 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
art. 3.   
56
 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., p. 169.  
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4. The Protection of Refugees: Asylum and Temporary Solutions 
 
The formal protection granted to a refugee in a host country is usually defined as “asylum”. The 
core content of this concept can be considered to be the long-term “[…] protection granted to a foreign 
national against the exercise of jurisdiction by another State […]”,57 usually characterised by the 
admission to residence. It must be noted that no international instrument imposes on States an 
obligation to grant asylum:
58
 notwithstanding the inclusion of article 14.1 in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948, which states that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other 
countries asylum from persecution,”59 no further steps were undergone by States to give a legally 
binding value to the principle enshrined by the 1948 Declaration.  
The 1967 UN General Assembly Declaration on Territorial Asylum for example, stresses that 
the decision to grant asylum is inherent to States‟ sovereignty and that the burden of a refugee crisis has 
to be shared by the entire international community.
60
 On the other hand, the 1977 United Nations 
Conference on Territorial Asylum did not reach any relevant conclusion.
61
 Generally speaking, States 
refuse to be bound by a legal obligation to grant asylum, even to accept the existence of a humanitarian 
practice of granting protection to refugees. Furthermore, the concept of asylum intended as protection 
and the principle of non-refoulement are clearly linked: States cannot prohibit the entry of refugees, but 
this does not mean that they are obliged to provide long-term solutions for all refugees entering their 
territory. 
The problems related to the granting of asylum are particularly evident in correspondence to 
mass influxes. In these contingencies, States feel endangered by the impact massive movements across 
borders can have on their internal stability, in particular when refuge seekers do not belong to the same 
ethnic group as the majority of the population. Moreover, large-scale displacements usually take place 
in areas characterised by a combination of lack of stability and underdevelopment.
62
 
In conditions of mass displacements of a population across borders it is thus very difficult for 
States to grant durable solutions, particularly in the form of asylum. The 1951 Convention was 
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 Ibidem, p. 173.  
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 Ibidem, p. 174. 
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 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14.1. 
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 UNGA res. 2312(XXII), 14 December 1967; see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., pp. 175-176.  
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 Ibidem, p. 181.  
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 Even if it is not possible to single out a pattern of causes leading to mass displacements since every situation is 
characterized by peculiarities flowing from the political, social and economic background of a country, very often large-
scale exoduses are produced by civil war or ethnic conflicts, as, for example, in the cases of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Sudan, 
Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Guatemala, etc.; for an overview see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee…, cit., pp. 174-195. 
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elaborated with the individual refugee in mind,
63
 but the many humanitarian crises of the last fifty years 
have shown that it is very difficult to apply the concept of asylum as conceived in the 1950s.  
In order to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties, States started the practice of granting 
asylum on a temporary basis. The concept of temporary refuge, as defined by different international 
instruments starting from the 1980s,
64
 flows from the principles of non-refoulement and of international 
solidarity: States are obliged to allow refugees to cross borders and receive protection against 
persecution under the principle of non-refoulement, but the responsibilities related to their long-term 
protection lie with the entire international community. It can be maintained that “[…] in admitting large 
numbers of persons in need of protection and in scrupulously observing non-refoulement, the State of 
first admission can be seen as acting on behalf of the international community.”65  
States of first asylum agree on the admission of large groups of refugees on a temporary basis 
relying on the assistance of the international community to arrange durable solutions. These durable 
solutions change according to the peculiar characteristics of each different mass displacement and 
range from resettlement in a third country to repatriation: in Europe, for example, during the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia, temporary protection was granted pending return in the country of origin, while 
in South East Asia in the period of mass displacements of population from Viet Nam and Cambodia, 
refugees were allowed entry until a third country agreed on their resettlement.
66
 Whatever the durable 
solution, refugees are always entitled to the application of minimum standards of protection while in 
the country of first asylum. 
Temporary refuge or protection constitutes a flexible instrument to face humanitarian crisis and 
provides “[…] the necessary theoretical nexus between the admission of refugees and the attainment of 
lasting solutions.”67 
Among refugees there are some categories whose protection poses peculiar challenges to the 
international community: women refugees undoubtedly belong to a particularly vulnerable category 
within displaced persons; this is why several documents dealing with their needs have been elaborated 
since the 1980s. The study of these documents is the subject of next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: DEFINING SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REFUGEES 
 
 
1. Gender and Sex: Two Different Concepts 
 
The concept of gender is not always used in the proper way, and is often considered just as a 
synonym of sex. In reality, the two terms not only have different meanings, but also different 
connotations. 
Sex refers to the biological characteristics of men and women, mainly with regard to the 
differences in their reproductive functions. Gender refers to the social characteristics that are attached 
to the sexes, including expectations for the proper behaviour of men and women within societies. There 
is no unique definition of gender, since the roles attached to men and women change according to 
different factors, including the social environment, the ethnic origins, and the historical period. 
Therefore, gender is not an invariable concept, but a learned construction which can be changed.
68
 
It is fundamental to grasp the concept of gender in order to have a precise understanding of 
gender-based violence and its root causes. When employing the term gender in fact, both women and 
men are included in the discussion. Even if women are usually the main targets of acts of gender-
violence perpetrated by men, men can suffer forms of violence based on gender too, as, for example, 
forced conscription in the armed forces.
69
 
This chapter aims at giving an overview of sexual and gender-based violence with a specific 
attention to episodes occurring in refugee settings, and a particular focus on sexual violence because of 
its major consequences on the wellbeing of refugee communities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 For definitions of gender see for example Women‟s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Masculinities: Male 
Roles and Male Involvement in the Promotion of Gender Equality A Resource Packet, September 2005, p. 4, at 
www.womenscommission.org/pdf/masc_res.pdf; UNHCR, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees 
and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response, May 2003, p. 11, at www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home?page=protect&id=3b83a48d4. 
69
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2. Typologies of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against Women 
 
Although men can suffer from Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), women are usually 
the main victims/survivors
70
 of this kind of violation of basic human rights. “Women around the world 
are usually in a disadvantaged position compared to men of the same social and economic level. 
Gender roles and identities usually involve inequality and power imbalance between women and men. 
Violence against women, and its acceptance within society and cultures, is one of the manifestations of 
this inequality and power imbalance.”71 
This power imbalance between genders can be considered one of the main causes of SGBV 
directed against women. The same interpretation is given by the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women approved by the General Assembly in 1993.
72
 According to 
the Declaration, violence against women encompasses “[…]any act of gender-based violence that 
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public 
or in private life.”73 Article 2 of the Declaration provides a list of acts of violence against women, at the 
same time underlining that they can be perpetrated at different levels: within the family, in the 
community and by the State.
74
 
SGBV encompasses, but is not limited to, acts of sexual violence. In fact, it can be noted that 
the use of the term Sexual and Gender-Based Violence can be somehow misleading since it explicitly 
contains a reference to sexual violence which is only one of the types of gender-based violence. For 
this reason some international humanitarian agencies, as, for example, the Reproductive Health 
Response in Conflict Consortium, prefer to use the term Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in order to 
encompass in programmes operating under this label the social context in which acts of violence 
against women occur, in particular by including men in every step of projects aimed at the reduction of 
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this phenomenon.
75
 Notwithstanding the above, the term that will be used in this work is Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence in order to reflect the terminology used by UNHCR and other major 
humanitarian agencies. 
According to UNHCR‟s categorization, the main forms of SGBV can be grouped into five 
typologies:  
 sexual violence, including rape, attempted rape, sexual exploitation and sexual harassment;  
 physical violence, which also encompasses trafficking;76 
 emotional and psychological violence;  
 harmful traditional practices, in particular Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), early and/or 
forced marriages, honour killings, infanticide and denial of education for girls;  
 and socio-economic violence, consisting in acts denying women the enjoyment of basic 
economic and social rights, for example through discriminatory laws.
77
 
Notwithstanding the gravity of all of the above-mentioned acts of SGBV, a deeper 
understanding of sexual violence is merited for two main reasons: its effects on the survivor and on her 
community are particularly severe; and the evolution of its consideration by the international 
community gives a clear example of one of the main problems characterizing the overall approach to 
violence against women, that is the dichotomy between the “private” and the “public” spheres. 
Sexual violence can be defined as every act implying physical or psychological violence 
directed against the sexual characteristics of an individual or linked to the sphere of sexuality.
78
 Rape is 
the most common crime of sexual violence, but within this category it is also possible to include sexual 
constriction, consisting of forcing the victim/survivor to perform sexual acts with another person,
79
 
sexual mutilation, sexual slavery and forced pregnancy. Despite the numerous cases in which rape and 
other forms of sexual violence have been used during armed conflicts, the international community has 
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been silent on the issue for a long time, with the only references to these crimes limited to the 
prohibition of crimes against “honour”.80 Sexual violence has for a long time been considered as 
belonging to the “private” sphere of individuals, in which the State does not have to be involved, as 
well as being an unavoidable consequence of armed conflicts.  
An important change in the international community‟s approach to sexual violence was brought 
about by the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc criminal courts created by the Security Council to judge 
the perpetrators of the atrocities committed during the ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda: thanks to their jurisprudence, a clear juridical definition of rape was elaborated for the first 
time at the international level;
81
 further, the activity of both tribunals showed that sexual violence 
during conflicts not only is an avoidable phenomenon, but it constitutes a weapon used by combatants 
to morally and physically undermine the members of the opposing faction. Moreover, the role of these 
two tribunals is undeniable in the inclusion in the Statute of the International Criminal Court of a 
detailed list of sexual crimes within the acts amounting to crimes against humanity.
82
  
A wide range of consequences can be singled out with regard to every form of SGBV. Effects 
are usually more visible in cases of violent acts such as rape or other forms of sexual and non-sexual 
physical violence; this, in any case, does not mean that less evident outcomes of SGBV, such as an 
increase in the survivors‟ sense of insecurity and isolation, do not bring about severe and long-term 
negative results: “[v]ictims/survivors of sexual and gender-based violence are at high risk of severe 
health and psycho-social problems, sometimes leading to death, even in the absence of physical 
assault.”83 The social stigma attached to the survivors of SGBV, in particular of sexual violence, has, 
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for instance, consequences which are not limited to the direct target, but encompass the entire 
community since the survivor‟s increased isolation can bring to the loss of his or her social function. In 
the case of female survivors, this often means that duties traditionally belonging to them, such as child-
care and food gathering and preparation, are no longer going to be performed resulting in self-evident 
consequences on the wellbeing of their families. Health problems arising from SGBV have an even 
clearer effect on the entire community, since chronic health consequences impact negatively on the 
contribution of the survivors to the development of his or her community and on the sustainability of 
the health care system.
84
 
With regard to the several forms of SGBV to which women can be subjected in the different 
moments of their lives, it can be useful to report the table elaborated by L. Heise and included in many 
documents addressing SGBV against women: 
 
Gender Violence throughout a Woman’s Life85 
 
 
As it is highlighted by the table, women can suffer from SGBV in different forms during every 
period of their lives. It is also important to underline that episodes of SGBV against women happen in 
every country of the world, cross-cutting social classes and ethnic groups.  
It has already been said that the imbalance in the power relation between genders can be 
considered as the root cause of SGBV; nonetheless, the incidence of this phenomenon can increase 
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when other factors likely to foster an exacerbation of violent behaviours, such as wars, are present. 
Further elements that can increase the risk for women of being subjected to SGBV are, among others, 
the existence of traditional legal systems discriminating against women, the economic dependence of 
women from male relatives, and mental or physical disabilities of the possible target of acts of 
violence.
86
 Clearly enough, all these factors can have an increased impact in situations in which the 
traditional social system aimed at protecting women and female-children is undermined, as it is the 
case during displacement. The analysis of SGBV in refugee settings, of its causes and, in particular, of 
the possible solutions proposed by UNHCR in its “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence against 
Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced: Guidelines for Prevention and Response” is the subject 
of the following section.  
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3. UNHCR’s Guidelines for Prevention of and Response to Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence in Refugee Settings. 
 
Many aspects of SGBV affecting women refugees have been already addressed in the previous 
section; nevertheless, since the conditions characterizing displacement are peculiar and can expose 
women to further risks, it is worth examining the leading document issued by UNHCR aimed at 
addressing the threats to the safety and wellbeing of women refugees. 
UNHCR issued the first “Sexual Violence: Guidelines for Prevention and Response” in 1995. 
These first Guidelines were mainly focused on the analysis of rape and only briefly addressed problems 
such as harmful traditional practices and domestic violence. Another shortcoming was the absence of 
clear indications on how field workers should act in order to limit the incidence of SGBV in refugee 
settings. Further, the 1995 Guidelines left a vacuum regarding which sector of the agency was to be in 
charge of organizing specific activities to address the phenomenon.
87
 The 1995 Guidelines were then 
revised based on the Inter-Agency Lessons Learned Conference of March 2001,
88
 which highlighted 
the above-mentioned limitations, and issued in May 2003. 
The revised Guidelines give an initial overview of the phenomenon of SGBV, highlighting its 
typologies, causes and consequences. Echoing the table elaborated by Heise
89
 on the forms of SGBV 
women can be subjected to during their life-cycle, Susan J. Purdin developed a table summarizing the 
forms of violence women refugees can suffer during the refugee-cycle: 
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Sexual and Gender-Based Violence during the Refugee Cycle
90
 
 
 
As clearly shown in this table, women refugees are highly exposed to the risk of being subjected 
to SGBV during all the phases composing the refugee-cycle. The factors contributing to this increased 
likelihood for women refugees to be victims/survivors of SGBV episodes lie on the peculiar 
characteristics of displaced settings and can be summarised as follows: 
 Collapse of social and family support structures; 
 Geographical location and local environment (high crime area); 
 Design and social structure of camp (overcrowded, multi-household, dwellings, 
communal shelter); 
 Design of services and facilities; 
 Predominantly male camp leadership (and its gender-biased decisions); 
 Unavailability of food, fuel, income generation, leading to movement in isolated areas; 
 Lack of police protection; 
 Lack of UNHCR/NGO presence in camp; 
 Lack of security patrols; 
 Lack of individual registration and identity cards; 
 Hostility of local population (refugees are considered materially privileged).91 
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The SGBV Guidelines, as revised following the inputs resulting from the Inter-Agency Lessons 
Learned Conference, are mainly focused on providing the staff of both UNHCR and its implementing 
partners with practical tools to both prevent and respond to SGBV in refugee settings. 
A very important aspect of the Guidelines is the focus on the “Multi-Sectoral Approach” 
(MSA), defined as “[…] the framework upon which actions to prevent and respond to sexual and 
gender-based violence are built.”92 The MSA aims at creating the conditions enabling the different 
sectors encompassed in every activity of protection, namely health, psycho-social, legal and 
safety/security, to work together in addressing SGBV. Within the framework provided by MSA, all 
relevant actors have to be involved, with a clear emphasis on the participation of the refugee 
community itself. More specifically, the male leadership of the communities has to take a primary role 
in promoting activities of prevention of and response to SGBV, since without its involvement changes 
in the general attitude of the population cannot be achieved. The involvement of adolescents is as well 
considered crucial in order to “[…] change attitudes and assumptions that may underlie sexual and 
gender-based violence.”93 Besides the direct involvement of the beneficiaries, MSA also highlights the 
need of cooperating with other United Nations agencies, NGOs, the host Government and the host 
community.
94
   
With regard to the activities of prevention, emphasis is put on the importance of singling-out the 
root causes of SGBV through an assessment addressing the cultural traditions and norms of both the 
refugee and host communities, the places or moments in which refugees are more exposed to episodes 
of SGBV and the organizations setting up SGBV projects in all the sectors critical to protection 
activities.
95
 Prevention must focus on five main objectives, each achievable through specific strategies: 
the change of socio-cultural norms, through, among other things, the promotion of campaigns aimed at 
informing the refugee community of the consequences of SGBV and programmes for the 
empowerment of women and girls; the reconstruction of family and community networks by, for 
instance, establishing recreational events inside refugee camps; the design of efficient facilities which 
can help minimize the exposure to episodes of SGBV; the monitoring of the traditional legal systems 
adopted within the refugee community to address SGBV and of their consistency with international 
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human rights standards; and, finally, the elaboration of an effective system to monitor and report 
episodes of SGBV.
96
  
While planning prevention activities to help the identification of the causes of SGBV is of 
outstanding importance, it is also necessary to clearly recognise the consequences of these acts both on 
the victim/survivor and the community in order to elaborate effective and efficient responses. The focal 
point of every response activity relies on the existence of a referral system which enables 
victims/survivors to report episodes of violence.
97
 The lack of reporting is in fact one of the main 
problems to face while elaborating projects addressing SGBV. The reasons for the absence (or a very 
low rate) of reports on SGBV episodes range from the social stigma attached to victims/survivors to a 
general sense of impunity for the perpetrators, which is often fostered by the traditional conflict-
resolution mechanisms which are, in many cases, biased by a patriarchal approach. As underlined by 
the SGBV Guidelines, an effective reporting system has to be first known by both the refugee 
community and the humanitarian staff, so that “[…] victim/survivor knows where to go to receive 
assistance and receives that assistance in a timely manner.”98 Further, the staff receiving the report has 
to be trained in order to provide adequate and sensitive assistance to the person of concern. As to the 
responses, these must be developed in every sector always involving the refugee community.
99
  
This brief overview of the SGBV Guidelines gives an idea of their main aim, which is to offer 
field workers adequate tools to enable them to prevent and to timely and effectively respond to 
instances of SGBV; as is the case for every document that is drafted with a field level focus, the real 
challenge consists in their implementation.  
The next chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the main risks women refugees can encounter 
during displacement with the aim of linking the above-analysed documents to the reality experienced 
by hundreds of thousands of women in refugee settings all over the world.
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CHAPTER 3: WOMEN REFUGEES: A CATEGORY IN NEED OF 
SPECIAL PROTECTION 
 
 
1. Introduction: Some Statistical Data 
 
In every refugee situation, women amount to about the half of the displaced population: 
according to UNHCR‟s “Global Refugee Trends of 2004”,100 49% of the world‟s refugees are women 
and in cases of mass displacements this percentage usually increases.
101
 Age-wise, women constitute 
the majority of the over-60 refugee population,
102
 reflecting the higher life-expectancy of women 
world-wide.  
One of the reasons for the high percentage of women within refugee communities around the 
world is that they form the majority of the civilian population during armed conflicts. When wars are 
within the borders of States and characterised by a clash between different ethnic groups, civilians 
become the main target: this is why these conflicts are the main source of mass population movements, 
both across and within States borders. Moreover, these kinds of conflicts affect women in a different 
way than men: “[m]en and boys are more likely to carry weapons and be party to the conflict. Women 
and children are more likely to be civilian casualties, innocent victims of warring factions and the 
recipients of male violence and aggression.”103  
In situations of chaos, the imbalance of power between the genders often results in mass 
violations of women‟s rights, in particular in the form of SGBV, and in women being forced to provide 
for the wellbeing of their families while men are fighting or killed during the conflict. Women are often 
deliberately targeted during ethnic cleansing actions, as occurred in Bosnia, Rwanda and East Timor,
104
 
and are also more exposed to “collateral damages”, such as landmines, since they are in charge of 
collecting water and firewood in areas made unsafe by the ongoing fighting. Pushed by the necessity of 
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fleeing from the combatants and the need of sustaining their relatives, women seek refuge by crossing 
borders or moving to different regions of their countries.
105
 
Women can be obliged to leave their homes not only by conflicts, but also by other factors: for 
example, women are often subjected to human rights violations because of the political activities of 
their male relatives; they are more exposed to extreme poverty, constituting 70% of the world 
population living below the subsistence level; and they suffer from forms of violence deriving directly 
from their gender, such as harmful traditional practices, domestic violence and inhumane punishments 
for lack of respect of social norms. In summary, the reasons pushing women to flee their homes lie in 
the inequality of the conditions they experience within their societies and their consequent exclusion 
from their communities‟ political, economic and social life.106 
Notwithstanding the high number of women refugees and internally displaced world-wide, the 
number of female asylum-seekers is markedly lower than the one of men,
107
 reflecting both a poorer 
awareness by women refugees of the rights arising from their condition and the tendency of society to 
consider women as dependent on the claims for asylum of their male relatives.
108
 
Women refugees are thus especially vulnerable in all of the phases of the refugee cycle: as the 
United Nations Secretary General stated, “[t]he differential impact of armed conflict and specific 
vulnerabilities of women can be seen in all phases of displacement.”109 The reasons for this 
vulnerability and the actions taken by UNHCR to address the protection of women refugees are the 
subject of this chapter. 
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2. Why are Women Refugees in Need of Special Protection? 
 
As seen above, women constitute about half of the refugee population world-wide; if we add to 
this figure the number of children following their female relatives during displacement, the percentage 
greatly increases, with women and children constituting 80% of the total displaced population of the 
world.
110
 
Notwithstanding this striking statistic, the attention to their particular needs is only quite 
recent.
111
 One of the main reasons for the decades-long lack of consideration is that the specific kinds 
of violence affecting women have been long considered as belonging to the “personal sphere”, so that 
“in the refugee context, one finds a consistent lack of attention to the particular experiences of refugee 
women and their special needs in refugee camps and in obtaining permanent resettlement.”112 The 
definition of refugee provided by Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, for example, is clearly drafted 
with a man applicant in mind, is lacking of references to gender as a ground of persecution and is based 
in particular on political activities which are still considered a male realm in many countries.
113
 
But why are women and girl-children so vulnerable in refugee-like situations? As stated in 
UNHCR “Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women”114 drafted in 1991, “[w]omen share the 
protection problems experienced by all refugees”,115 namely against refoulement, armed attacks, 
unjustified detention and to favour access to basic economic and social rights; but in addition to these 
basic requirements “[…] refugee women and girls have special protection needs that reflect their 
gender: they need, for example, protection against manipulation, sexual and physical abuse and 
exploitation, and protection against sexual discrimination in the delivery of goods and services.”116  
One of the main reasons for the high vulnerability of women in refugee settings is that 
displacement often provokes a change in the traditional social structures providing for their protection: 
                                                 
110
 Carolyn Patty Blum and Nancy Kelly, The Protection of Women Refugees, in Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig 
(eds), Women and International Human Rights Law, New York, Transnational Publishers, vol. 3, 2001, p. 198. 
111
 UNHCR started addressing the issue of the protection of women refugees only in the 1980s; see Jeanne Ward, Gender-
Based Violence among Conflict-affected Populations…, cit., pp. 69-70; for a more in depth analysis of UNHCR‟s 
documents and activities on women refugees see next section. 
112
 Carolyn Patty Blum and Nancy Kelly, The Protection of Women Refugees, cit., p. 198.  
113
 Ibidem, pp. 199-200; see also UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, May 2002, in 
“International Journal of Refugee Law”, vol. 14, No. 2/3, p. 459; the same remark can be done with regard to the United 
Nations Convention against Torture, see Hannah Pearce, An Examination of the International Understanding of Political 
Rape…, cit. 
114
 UNHCR, Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (hereinafter Guidelines), paragraph 2, July 1991, at 
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=protect&id=3b83a48d4. 
115
 Ibidem, paragraph 2. 
116
 Ibidem, paragraph 3.  
 36 
women can find themselves for the first time in charge of providing for the needs of their families, 
assuming different roles than the ones customarily belonging to them.
117
 Furthermore, the change in 
gender roles deriving from the particular conditions characterising life in refugee settings often creates 
a sense of frustration in men, no longer able to provide for the material needs of their families. Since in 
almost every society the concept of masculinity is strictly related to the success in the economic field, 
“[…] changing roles and the loss of breadwinner status can have very damaging effects on the male 
ego.”118 Men can find themselves in a condition that does not reflect the idea of gender roles they have 
been used to considering as “normal”. This feeling can be reinforced by the activities of humanitarian 
agencies within refugee communities aimed at empowering women in order to reduce their likeliness of 
being subjected to SGBV. When these projects target only women, their possibility of success is 
limited; moreover, men feel excluded with the risk of further fostering the disrupt of social 
equilibrium.
119
 The increase in domestic violence
120
 and drug and alcohol abuse
121
 within refugee 
populations is often a consequence of men‟s frustration and of the construction and deconstruction of 
gender roles. To contrast these tendencies, it is of paramount importance to include men in gender-
based projects.
122
 
Sexual violence is a particularly serious risk to which women refugees are subjected. Rape and 
other forms of sexual violence can happen for many reasons, from the continuation of a policy of ethnic 
cleansing, to retaliation for a woman‟s independence and economic success within the refugee 
community, to the above-mentioned lack of traditional mechanisms of protection.
123
 Whatever the 
reason, the consequences are exceptionally severe not only for the survivor, but for the entire 
community. Women who experience sexual violence are highly exposed to both physical and 
psychological problems with overwhelming consequences on their ability to contribute to their 
communities‟ development. Due to the social stigma attached to rape, the majority of survivors never 
report the incident, so precise data on the incidence of sexual violence within displaced populations are 
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not available;
124
 nevertheless, numerous reports on the conditions of women refugees all over the world 
make clear that the number of women experiencing sexual violence during every phase of the 
displacement cycle is extremely high.
125
 
While displaced, women, and in particular female children, are tremendously exposed to 
traditional harmful practices, including female genital mutilation, early or forced marriages, honour 
killings, infanticide or neglect leading to death of girls, and denial of education. Data show that in 
displaced contexts female genital mutilation and early marriages increase both as a consequence of 
society‟s will not to lose their traditional culture in uprooted conditions, and as a way to provide a male 
protector to young girls through marriage.
126
 
Women in refugee camps are also overloaded with their daily activities: “[t]hey not only must 
contend with carrying out their traditional roles as food preparers, water and wood gatherers, and child 
care providers, but they must attempt to maintain the family‟s sense of cohesion, well-being, and 
cultural values […]”.127 Often, this means that women and girl-children refugees do not have the time 
to receive health treatments or participate in activities that could enhance their preparedness and 
awareness, increasing their independence and possibility to react to violations of their basic rights.
128
 
Furthermore, in the case of girl refugees, the burden of domestic tasks often causes them to drop-out of 
school and thus suffer long-lasting consequences in terms of their ability to actively participate in their 
communities‟ life. 
Women are also more exposed to the consequences of food shortages, both because of the 
inequities still existing in the system of distribution of food-items
129
 and as a result of traditional social 
structures that put the needs of women after those of their male relatives and of their children.
130
 
Clearly enough, the lack of food brings about serious health problems not only for women, but also for 
their children, resulting in a predictable increase in maternal and child death rates. Moreover, a food 
and non-food distribution system which discriminates against women can have serious protection 
consequences: in many cases it has been reported that “[…] women, girls and boys had to exchange sex 
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for food when they receive no or inadequate food rations.”131 Women are also obliged to leave the 
relatively safe camp environment in order to augment food rations, thus exposing themselves to a 
higher possibility of being assaulted by military personnel, police, fighters or members of the host 
community, who are often hostile towards refugees because can be considered as materially 
privileged.
132
 
With regard to the system of distribution of humanitarian aid items, the registration of refugees 
covers a fundamental role: if registration criteria coincide with the singling-out of heads of households, 
very often only men will be entitled to personal documentation. Women without documents are more 
exposed both to discrimination in the distribution of food and non-food items and to assaults while 
leaving the camps in order to provide for the needs of their families.
133
 
Among women refugees, some groups are in particular need of special protection due to their 
higher vulnerability. This is the case of young girls who are especially exposed to the risk of being 
trafficked, abducted by armed factions as porters, combatants or sex slaves, and, lacking the necessary 
knowledge, more easily subjected to sexually transmittable diseases.
134
 Elderly women are also an 
especially vulnerable group, in particular when they are alone: the international community has often 
treated them more as “[…] persons with multiple needs rather than as resources with a lifetime of 
experience and wisdom,”135 so that they suffer from greater marginalization and exposure to abuses. 
The same can be said of mentally and physically disabled women, who can be easily subjected to 
sexual and physical violence, in addition to often being the last to receive health and food assistance.
136
 
Urban refugees and internally displaced are also groups in need of special attention since the particular 
conditions of their displacement make it difficult for humanitarian agencies to provide them with 
minimum standards of protection.
137
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Considering these main factors of risk women refugees face, it is now the moment to analyse 
the counter-measures adopted by humanitarian agencies, in particular UNHCR, to cope with the 
challenges related to the protection of this particularly vulnerable category of displaced persons. 
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3. The International Protection of Women Refugees 
 
The first documents drafted by UNHCR directly addressing the particular conditions of 
displaced women date back two decades: in 1985, after the Third World Conference on Women held in 
Nairobi, a working group on female refugees was created in order to increase the international 
community‟s attention to the special needs of women affected by armed conflicts,138 needs that had 
been already highlighted by the problems faced by Vietnamese and Afghani women refugees during 
the 1970s and early 1980s.
139
 
In the same year, UNHCR‟s Executive Committee issued the first conclusion related to the 
special protection needs of women refugees.
140
 The Executive Committee stressed the necessity for 
States and UNHCR to address the special problems faced by women refugees, recognizing that “[…] 
these problems result from their vulnerable situation which frequently exposes them to physical 
violence, sexual abuse, and discrimination.”141 The Committee further noted the importance of 
sustaining projects aimed at empowering women through education and income generating activities, 
the need for the direct participation of women in projects elaborated to increase their protection and the 
necessity of collecting precise data on women refugees in order to implement projects really 
responding to the most pressing issues affecting them while displaced.
142
  
In the last paragraph of the 1985 Executive Committee‟s Conclusion, an important reference is 
made to the possibility for States Parties to the 1951 Convention to include women asylum-seekers in 
the “particular social group” category in the sense of Article 1A(2) of the Convention.143  
During the 1980s, significant precedents of operational applications of special projects 
addressing issues affecting displaced women were developed within the Central American refugee 
communities: UNHCR, together with NGOs involved in relief projects, started programmes aimed at 
developing skills and awareness of displaced women coming mainly from rural backgrounds in 
                                                 
138
 Jeanne Ward, Gender-Based Violence among Conflict-affected Populations…, cit., p. 69. 
139
 Women‟s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women and Guidelines on Their 
Protection…, cit., p. 11. 
140
 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner‟s Programme, Refugee Women and International Protection, No. 39 
(XXXVI), 1985, at www.unhcr.org. 
141
 Ibidem, paragraph d). 
142
 Ibidem, paragraphs g)-i). 
143
 Ibidem, paragraph k); for a brief analysis of the development of the determination of refugee status for cases of gender-
based persecution see Annex 1 to the present work. 
 41 
Guatemala and El Salvador. The success of the initiative was highlighted by the participation of these 
women in the negotiation of the terms for the return to their countries.
144
 
The increased attention of the international community in the protection of women refugees 
resulted, in 1989, in the appointment of the first UNHCR Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women, 
whose main responsibility was to elaborate proposals of policies to be incorporated in UNHCR‟s 
programmes with the aim of responding to displaced women‟s special needs.145 At first, this position 
was created on a temporary basis, but it became soon clear that the problems affecting women refugees 
needed a continuous and expert attention, so that in 1992 the post was integrated in the organizational 
budget and transformed in a stable position.
146
 
In 1990, UNHCR‟s Executive Committee issued the “Policy on Refugee Women”:147 based on 
this document, UNHCR released the “Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women” the following 
year.
148
 The purpose of the Guidelines was to “[…] help the staff of UNHCR and its implementing 
partners to identify the specific protection issues, problems and risks facing refugee women”149 by both 
outlining measures to be taken in order to increase women refugees‟ protection, and responses to 
violations already occurred.
150
 The structure of the Guidelines reflects this purpose: the document is 
divided in different sections which touch upon every step to be taken in order to enhance the protection 
of women refugees, from the assessment and planning process, to the more appropriate interventions to 
respond to physical and legal protection problems, and from the improvements needed in refugee 
settings (for example in the camps design and in the distribution of humanitarian aid), to the actions 
needed in order to respond to protection issues and to report on them.
151
 
In 2001, the Women‟s Commission on Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC) issued an 
independent assessment
152
 on the application of the Guidelines with the aim of identifying the main 
successes and shortcomings of a decade of their implementation. The impact of the recommendations 
contained by this report on UNHCR‟s operations was then analysed, together with the one of two other 
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independent assessments on refugee children and community services, by UNHCR‟s Executive 
Committee in June 2004.
153
 WCRWC‟s report underlined that the Guidelines played a major role in 
“[…] raising awareness, serving as a programming tool and prompting the development of other tools 
for field workers […]”, but at the same time acknowledged that the Guidelines needed to be revised 
since they “[…] do not provide enough guidance on sexual exploitation, domestic violence, urban 
refugees and the internally displaced.”154 With regard to their implementation, the report recognised 
that the Guidelines had a very positive impact on some aspects of both protection and assistance 
activities,
155
 but it noticed that “[o]verall, implementation of the Guidelines was found to be uneven 
and incomplete, occurring on an ad hoc basis in certain sites rather than in a globally consistent and 
systematic way.”156 Among the main barriers to the full application of the Guidelines, the WCRWC 
particularly emphasised that their contents were not yet standard operating principles and that a cut in 
financial and staff resources was not helping their homogeneous application. Moreover, women 
refugees still had insufficient participation in decision-making, especially when illiterate and 
particularly poor, and cases of SGBV were still underreported.
157
  
Among the actions taken by UNHCR in order to follow the recommendations contained by 
WCRWC‟s report, particular relevance has the implementation of the “Gender equality and age 
mainstreaming pilot project”. This project is based on a “[…] multifunctional approach which requires 
the Representative of each participating country office to form a team comprised of protection, 
programme and community service staff.”158 Its main aim is to address one of the shortcomings 
highlighted by the independent assessments analysed by the Executive Committee, the lack of 
coordination between sectors in dealing with issues affecting women refugees. With regard to SGBV, 
UNHCR held several training workshops in order to improve the knowledge of this phenomenon 
within its staff and its implementing partners, as well as responding to the need for transposing the 
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principles contained by the Guidelines into operational standards as highlighted by WCRWC‟s 
report.
159
 
Apart from the Guidelines, one of the most relevant documents dealing with the protection of 
women refugees is “Sexual and Gender based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally 
Displaced Persons: Guidelines for Prevention and Response,” analysed in the previous chapter.160  
UNHCR‟s will to increase the protection accorded to women refugees was also reflected by the 
declaration in 2001 of the High Commissioner‟s Five Commitments to Refugee Women, released as a 
response to consultations held with women refugees from all across the world during the same year.
161
 
The five commitments address several issues affecting women refugees, stressing the importance of 
including women in the management of refugee camps and refugee communities in other settings, in 
particular with regard to the distribution of food and non-food items, and providing every refugee, 
including women, with individual documentation. The importance of developing country-level projects 
to address SGBV and to make the delivery of sanitary material a standard practice of all UNHCR‟s 
projects are also part of the commitments.
162
    
Of course, women refugees are not only entitled to the special protection arising from their 
refugee condition, but also to all the relevant provisions of international human rights instruments 
dealing with women‟s rights, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women
163
 and the United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women.
164
 These instruments are significant not only in providing a 
framework for the protection of women refugees while displaced, but also to determine the refugee 
status of women on the grounds of SGBV. The issue of the determination of refugee status in cases of 
gender-related persecution is briefly analysed in the first annex to the present work. 
From the above, it is clear that, despite the significant delay, the situations affecting women 
refugees are now an integral part of UNHCR‟s as well as other relief agencies‟ policy towards 
displaced people. Notwithstanding the commitment to improve women refugees‟ livelihood, the real 
conditions encounter by the female population in refugee-settings is still very often characterised by 
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discrimination, and episodes of SGBV remain worryingly common within displaced communities. The 
effort put by humanitarian organizations is often rendered meaningless by the policies enacted by the 
host country towards refugees, in particular in non-Convention environments.  
The study of the conditions characterizing women refugees from Burma in Thailand, a State 
which is not party to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol, is the subject of the second part of the 
present work.  
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We Challenge You 
There I am, a virgin, pretty,  
A student at university 
Fair and full of youth 
With nothing artificial on my 
body,  
All natural curves.  
 
My age,  
Counted on tender leaves of  
thabyé 
At the time of the eighty-eight 
uprising,  
A shapely eighteen.  
 
Here at our university 
What is there to fear?  
I'll fight, fight 
And be unafraid,  
With no thought of surrender.  
Let's form a student's union!  
 
It was in March, 1988.  
One night in one of our fascist 
state prisons 
I was robbed of my virginity,  
Unable to defend myself 
I was pinioned,  
Powerless to move or struggle.  
I couldn't, I couldn't.  
It was like drowning in shallow 
water.  
 
My lips were kissed by those 
fascists,  
My breasts were in their mouths,  
And inside me ... those fascists....  
I was raped by a fascist 'security' 
force,  
Possessed alive by some evil nat 
inside 
As the guns of the moment with 
endless lust 
Tore away my virginity - 
One, two, three, four and more.  
I all but died.  
 
Nevertheless 
I did not die. Nor did I cry 
Though my womb had been 
defiled.  
I still love our resistance movement 
And love democracy.  
So hey,  
You fascist government!  
For gnawing away at my flesh and 
blood 
I can never ever forgive you, never.  
Never till the end of time.  
 
And hey!  
Successors of that government,  
You lackeys, you security force 
dogs!  
Come on, if you've got the guts,  
Come with your guns out down 
the path of bloodshed.  
There's a young woman here who's 
working for peace,  
A Burmese flower that has been 
ravished.  
You government lot, I'll fight to  
bring you down.  
We'll never be brought to our 
knees.  
We'll never surrender. 
- Poem written by a former activist for 
independence in commemoration of the 1988 
events, from “The Burma Project”, at 
www.burmadebate.org/archives/bdsummer98.h
tml -  
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CHAPTER 1: BRIEF POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 
BURMA 
 
A former British colony, Burma is “[…] a country rich in ethnic diversity, natural resources, 
and human tragedy”.165  
The Union of Myanmar
166
 is composed of seven Divisions and seven States: the Divisions are 
characterised by the presence of a population composed for its majority by Burmans, who amount to 
the 68% of the residents of the Union;
167
 the States, on the other hand, are inhabited by the seven major 
ethnic minorities of the country: the Shan, the Kayah
168
, the Kayin
169
, the Mon, the Chin, the Kachin 
and the Rakhine.
170
 These main ethnic groups are only a small part of the more than one hundred 
minorities that have been identified in the country, each of which with their different languages and 
habits, and usually living in border areas.
171
 The main religion of the country, practiced by the 89% of 
the population, is Theravada Buddhism;
172
 other religions include Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, 
Hinduism and Animism. It is interesting to note that religions other than Theravada Buddhism are 
usually practiced by the ethnic minorities, originally Animists or Buddhists, in part as an attempt to 
resist the policy of Burmanisation imposed by the military regime.
173
  
The country has been part of the British Raj from 1885 to 1948. Prior to and during the Second 
World War, a strong movement for independence arose led by Bogyoke
174
 Aung San who, in an 
attempt to hasten the process of independence from the British control, started fighting against the 
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Allied Powers by assisting Japan. This choice proved to be a major strategic mistake when Burma was 
ultimately invaded by Japan, and became a theatre of atrocities committed by the Japanese army 
against the civilian population. Aung San decided then to change alliances and support the British in 
their fight against Japan.
175
  
The leader of the decolonisation movement was well aware of the risks of fragmentation that 
independence could bring about: this is why, in an historical meeting with the leaders of the major 
ethnic groups of the country, he decided to give them the possibility of peacefully seceding from the 
Union some years after its creation, if this were the will of the communities they represented. Further, 
the high moral standing of Aung San was recognised by all the ethnic groups residing in Burma which 
considered him as a leader and a symbol of unity. Unfortunately, Bogyoke Aung San was killed in 
1947 by political opponents before he could witness the independence he had struggled for during all 
his life.  
As soon as Burma was declared independent, ethnic groups and Communist insurgents started a 
war against the central government then led by U Nu who, in an attempt to keep the nation united, 
appointed a former colleague of Bogyoke Aung San, Ne Win, as commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw 
(the Burmese army). General Ne Win took power in 1962, abolishing the Constitution and imposing a 
military government, or, as declared by the regime‟s newspaper “The New Light of Myanmar”, “the 
Tatmadaw assumed the State duty on 2 March, 1962 and saved the country.” [sic]176   
The ideology of the new government, which ruled Burma until 1988, was the so-called 
“Burmese Way to Socialism”, a “[…] highly idiosyncratic mix of Marxism, Buddhism and 
nationalism” which soon proved to be “[…] internally inconsistent and contradictory, displaying little 
regard for fundamental economic principles and social realities.”177  
Under Ne Win‟s rule, a country rich in economic, as well as human resources became one of the 
poorest countries of the world: “[i]n December 1987, with a per capita income of US$ 200 per annum, 
external debt of over US$ 4 billion, and foreign exchange reserves of US$ 20 million, Burma was 
admitted to least developed country (LDC) status by the United Nations.”178   
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Clear examples of the irrationality ruling the country under Ne Win‟s control are the 
demonetisations decided by the government in 1964, 1985 and 1987, each of which had a devastating 
impact on the savings of thousands of people. To add irrationality to an already disputable economic 
decision, in 1985 the 100 and 50 kyat notes were substituted by 15, 45 and 75 kyat notes, to be replaced 
only after two years by 90 kyat notes. The official aim of this policy was the struggle of the central 
government against the ethnic guerrillas and the widespread black market; in reality, there are good 
reasons to believe that the motivation is to be found in astrological calculations based on Ne Win‟s 
lucky number, 9, and the celebration of his 75
th
 birthday in 1985.
179
 
The last demonetisation is considered to be one of the leading factors in the eruption of peaceful 
demonstrations led by university students throughout the country in 1988 in favour of the end of the 
military regime and the institution of a democratic government. During the summer of 1988, Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Bogyoke Aung San‟s daughter, came back to Burma to take care of her dying 
mother. She immediately got involved in the political turmoil of the country, becoming a member of 
the new-born National League for Democracy (NLD) and delivering numerous speeches in front of 
thousands of people. On the 26
th
 of August 1988, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi gave the speech that 
confirmed her leading role in the non-violent fight for democracy in Burma, which started with the 
famous statement "I could not, as my father's daughter, remain indifferent to all that was going on. This 
national crisis could, in fact, be called the second struggle for national independence."
180
 
The answer of the regime was the violent repression of the manifestations; it is estimated that 
between three and ten thousand people were killed between August and September 1988, including 
Buddhist monks who, strong with the respect paid to them by the population, marched in front of the 
demonstrators in order to protect them from the army. Some analysts maintain that the disturbances 
characterizing the 1988 demonstrations were fostered by the army itself in order to create a general 
sense of panic within the population and strengthen the grip of the military regime, a supposition which 
is actually feasible considering the fact that in August of the same year 9000 inmates were suddenly 
released from different prisons throughout the country.
181
  
In September 1988, Ne Win left the position he held for more than twenty years, replaced by a 
military government known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The 
interpretation of the 1988 events and of the introduction of a government under direct military control 
given by the “New Light of Myanmar” is again worthy of mention: “In 1988, the people were 
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displeased with the policy and poor performance of the ruling government. Taking advantage of this, 
above-ground and underground insurgents and leftists and rightists and internal and external elements 
created disturbances. […] As a result, the Tatmadaw had to unavoidably assume the State duties on 18 
September, 1988 and saved the country.” [sic]182  
The SLORC called for free elections in May 1990, and although the NLD leader Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi had been under house arrest since July 1989, her party won the elections with an 
overwhelming majority. Nevertheless, the SLORC refused to transfer power to the democratically 
elected government and actually increased its repression of the pro-democracy movement, fostering a 
new flow of political opponents to third countries as it had already happened in the aftermath of the 
1988 events, when approximately 10.000 students sought refuge in Thailand. Since 1989 Mrs Suu Kyi, 
together with many other political activists, has been incarcerated or under house arrest for prolonged 
periods. The SLORC, which changed its name into State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 
1997, established a National Convention with the aim of drafting a new Constitution in 1993, but so far 
no result has been achieved. 
One of the main features characterizing recent Burmese history is the ongoing conflict between 
the central government and various groups of ethnic insurgents. From the moment of independence, 
Burma‟s stability has been undermined by endemic low-intensity conflicts with self-evident 
consequences on the overall development of the country. 
Ne Win, as well as the SLORC/SPDC, applied the so-called “Four Cut Policy”183 in order to 
weaken the ethnic insurgency. This policy consists in cutting off food, funds, intelligence and recruits 
to the guerrillas, mainly targeting the ethnic civilian population by forcibly relocating villages to areas 
under strict control of the army, destroying crops, recruiting civilians as porters and “human” mine 
detectors, and imposing exorbitant taxes on the villagers. Clearly enough, this policy is totally contrary 
to International Humanitarian Law and had the consequence of obliging thousands of civilians to seek 
refuge in neighbouring countries.  
Forced relocation of villages is a particularly serious problem in many border areas of the 
country. The main ethnic targets of this strategy are the Kayah and the Shan, but other ethnic minorities 
have also been obliged to leave their villages and move to rural or peri-urban areas characterised by a 
complete lack of basic services. It is estimated that in the Shan State alone in a period of less than three 
years (1996-1999) more than 300.000 people were forcibly relocated. A new wave of relocation and 
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the consequent influx of Shan villagers across the border Thailand took place in 2001. In 1999, as a 
consequence of the agreement reached between the United Wa State Party (UWSP) and the SPDC, a 
three-year programme to displace 50.000 Wa started with the aim of implementing development 
projects in the Northern areas of the Shan State, inhabited by the ethnic group. As a consequence of the 
replacement in the South, thousands of Wa died for health problems related to the change in the 
climatic conditions to which they were not accustomed. The relocated areas usually become free-fire 
zones where villagers are shot on sight if they try to access their former households and fields.
184
 
The “Pya Ley Pya” strategy is also applied in areas under ceasefire,185 sometimes with the co-
operation of the insurgents groups who signed agreements with the central government. Starting in 
1989, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, several armed groups decided to sign 
truces with the government.
186
 The major non-ceasefire groups are the Karen National Union (KNU) 
and the Shan State Army (SSA). Under these agreements, the insurgent groups were allowed to “[…] 
retain their weapons and engage in economic activities without interference from the Tatmadaw 
[…]”;187 in exchange, the insurgents had to recognise the sovereignty of SLORC/SPDC in the areas 
under their control, allowing the implementation of development projects by the central government 
and the passage of Tatmadaw troops in their territory.
188
 The fact that insurgents are permitted to 
maintain their armies poses serious doubts about the effective monopoly of force of the central 
government; besides, it is argued that many of the ceasefire groups‟ economic activities are mainly 
illegal.
189
 An example of the connection between ethnic insurgency leaders and the regime in the 
management of economic activities of doubtfully legality is given by the well-known drug barons Khun 
Sa, Lo Hsing-han and Pauk Yo Chang, chiefs of the  UWSP, a group that signed a ceasefire agreement 
in 1989. After signing the agreement, they have been living in Rangoon and apparently enjoy very 
good relations with the leaders of the junta.
190
  
The achievement of ceasefires did not coincide with the start of a demilitarization process; on 
the contrary, since 1988 the Tatmadaw has been subject to a massive modernisation effort, both in 
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terms of equipment and personnel.
191
 As stated by an analyst of Burmese politics, “[g]iven the lack of 
obvious threats from neighbouring states, only one conclusion can be drawn from this force 
modernisation and expansion in Burma: it is intended to contain internal threats to military rule.”192 
Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, Burmese junta Prime Minister and the person in charge of the 
powerful Military Intelligence (MI), was accused of corruption and obliged to resign in October 2004. 
The real reason for the exclusion of Khin Nyunt from the junta could be, more than his involvement in 
corruption episodes, the consequence of a struggle internal to the regime, in particular with the SPDC 
leader Than Shwe, defined by a Burmese historian residing in London as “[…] one of the most 
powerful and least educated people in Burma”.193 Following Khin Nyunt‟s forcible resignation, the MI 
apparatus was totally changed by the junta in an effort to eliminate his supporters. Besides being the 
promoter of the ceasefires agreements, Khin Nyunt was also the only person in the regime open to start 
inga dialogue with NLD and its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. As many analysts feared, Khin Nyunt‟s 
fall opened the path to a stricter government policy towards ethnic insurgents, political opposition and 
international agencies working in the country.  
In recent months, the junta decided to move the administrative capital from Rangoon to 
Pyinmana, a village in the Mandalay Division, close to the borders of the Shan and Kayah States: while 
officially this decision was aimed at increasing the control on the insurgents still fighting in the two 
States and the government safety from external attacks, the choice actually seems to be based on a 
fortune-teller‟s suggestion. Of course, this decision contributed to increasing the communication 
problems of United Nations agencies, international NGOs and embassies with the central 
government.
194
 Recently, four exiled political opposition groups have been designated as terrorist 
organisations by the regime.
195
 In the meanwhile, the repression of the civilian population continues in 
particular in the Kayah State, from where an estimated 15.000 people are currently fleeing towards the 
border with Thailand escaping a massive campaign of the Tatmadaw against ethnic Karen rebels.
196
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Mr. 
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Gambari, was recently allowed to visit Mrs Suu Kyi, who is still under house arrest,
197
 the latest 
developments in the country do not give rise to many reasons of hope for a democratic reform. 
The overall political situation, in particular the ongoing ethnic conflict in some areas of the 
country, has an enormous impact on women‟s livelihood and on their decision to flee to neighbouring 
countries, especially Thailand. The conditions of women in Burma, the analysis of the typologies of 
SGBV to which their subjected and their connection with the flight to Thailand are the subject of the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2: A REASON FOR FLEEING: SEXUAL AND GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE IN BURMA 
 
1. Gender Equality and SGBV in Burma: Between Propaganda and 
Reality 
 
The Burmese junta ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in 1997. The government presented the initial report in front of the 
CEDAW Committee during its 22
nd
 session in January 2000. The second report was due, as established 
by Article 18 of the CEDAW, four years after, but so far the Burmese government has not submitted it.  
In dealing with the Burmese government‟s statements it is always necessary to carefully 
distinguish between propaganda and reality. In a country in which many areas are totally closed to the 
presence of international organizations, it is often difficult to gather reliable information on the real life 
conditions faced by the population. For this reason, the role of local NGOs is of paramount importance. 
In relation to women‟s rights, a key source of information consists of the reports written by ethnic 
women‟s organizations working in neighbouring countries, especially Thailand, which have direct 
contact with refugees fleeing from the repression of the Tatmadaw.  
During the discussion in front of the CEDAW Committee, a shadow report was submitted by 
exiled women‟s groups. The organizations involved in the drafting of the report decided to elaborate a 
more in-depth analysis which resulted in the publication of “Gathering Strength: Women from Burma 
on their Rights”.198 This longer publication is the main source of information on women‟s conditions 
that is going to be used in this section.  
The official position of the Burmese government on gender issues is that women in Burma 
enjoyed a total equality with men since the real beginning of the country‟s history. According to this 
standpoint, discrimination on ground of gender simply does not exist; therefore, women enjoy exactly 
the same rights as men.
199
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Great emphasis is given to the influence of Buddhism on the relation between genders, in 
particular with regard to the absence of violence against women:
200
 if it is true that the Buddha “[…] 
never slighted the role of women, either in his personal life or in his mission of teaching the truth he 
had found”,201 it is also true that the interpretation of his teachings often does not reflect this equality 
between genders, as it is demonstrated by the different importance accorded to monks and nuns in the 
Burmese interpretation of Theravada Buddhism.
202
  
In general, from an analysis of the Initial Report in front of the CEDAW Committee, a culture 
of discrimination towards women is clear. For example, with regard to a woman‟s role in the family it 
is openly stated that the head of the household is the man, while women are in charge of all aspects of 
domestic management.
203
 
The aim of this part of the present work is to show the conflict between the regime‟s 
propaganda on gender equality and the real conditions of women in Burma. The main purpose is to 
demonstrate the connection between SGBV within the country and the decision to flee into 
neighbouring countries, in particular Thailand. Since an in-depth analysis of gender equality in Burma 
is beyond the scope of this work, it has been decided to analyse the different forms of SGBV 
confronting the regime‟s position with the findings of independent women‟s groups starting from the 
analysis of the five categories of SGBV enumerated by UNHCR.
204
 Sexual violence and rape will be 
separately analysed because of two main considerations: the widespread and systematic use of rape as a 
strategy of war has been proven by several reports by ethnic women‟s groups, as well as international 
NGOs; and from these reports it is clearly demonstrated that the high incidence of sexual violence in its 
different forms constitutes one of the main push factors for women and their families to cross the 
border with Thailand and other neighbouring countries. 
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I. Physical Violence 
 
According to UNHCR‟s categorization of the different forms of SGBV, physical violence 
corresponds to physical assaults, trafficking and slavery.
205
 Physical assaults consist of “beating, 
punching, kicking, biting, burning, maiming or killing, with or without weapons […]”206 and are often 
part of other forms of SGBV. With regard to perpetrators, it is possible to draw a line between 
members of the family or persons well-known to the victim/survivor, and unknown individuals, 
including members of armies or militias.
207
 
With regard to domestic violence, the official position of the Burmese government is that 
traditional society accords enough protection to women from this particular form of SGBV: “[a]lthough 
the findings of a study in two townships on the incidence of marital violence reveals that marital 
violence exists, the magnitude is not very great.” [sic]208 A contrary indication is given in independent 
studies which report that the incidence of domestic violence, in particular in the form of battery, is 
quite high;
209
 further, this violence is perceived as “normal” by the community, as demonstrated by the 
answer of a woman about the reaction of society in cases of domestic violence: “[i]f a man beats his 
wife, sometimes friends and family will intervene. If a man hits his wife a little bit, then it is 
normal.”210  In many cases, episodes go unreported both because of a general lack of trust towards the 
police and of pressure by society not to make private matters public. Another important element in 
explaining the low number of cases reported is that women in Burma have difficulties achieving 
financial independence, so they are often forced to endure a violent family environment. Above all, 
men are considered as the head of households whose decisions must be respected by the women of the 
family. This view is actually confirmed by the Burmese government‟s CEDAW report, in which it is 
openly stated that “[t]he head of the household is the father […]”.211 
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With regard to physical assaults perpetrated by unknown persons, in particular by members of 
the army, many independent researches underline their widespread occurrence, frequently in 
combination with other human rights abuses, in particular forced labour and sexual violence.
212
 
Trafficking of women and girls across borders in the Mekong region is a well-known 
phenomenon;
213
 nonetheless, according to the military junta “[…] there are a few cases of trafficking 
Myanmar women to neighbouring countries.” [sic]214 The government‟s measures to reduce the 
number of episodes of trafficking result in open limitations on women‟s freedom of movement, already 
limited in itself by the perception of their role in the society.
215
 Women encounter major difficulties in 
obtaining passports and are required to be accompanied by legal guardians or be provided with special 
travel permits while travelling. Whilst these measures seriously affect women‟s liberty, they do not 
contribute to a decrease in trafficking. On the contrary, since women are often compelled to leave 
Burma in order to find a job and provide for their families‟ basic needs, restrictive measures only result 
in an increase in briberies to cross borders, at the same time fostering women‟s vulnerability to 
traffickers.
216
 Considering the often exploitative conditions migrant workers are subjected to, it is 
sometimes difficult to draw a precise line between voluntary illegal migration and trafficking. In any 
case, according to the definition given by the United Nations “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children” to the “Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime”, fraud and deception can also be considered as elements amounting to coercion, 
recognised as the central element distinguishing trafficking from voluntary movement.
217
 Furthermore, 
the measures taken by the Burmese government are mainly based on the assumption that trafficked 
women are always engaged in sexual work, which is highly stigmatized by the society.
218
 In this way, 
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the many women trafficked and employed in domestic work or other forms of exploitative labours are 
not taken into account.  
A particularly worrying situation is the one faced by Rhoingya women, a Muslim ethnic group 
living in the Rakhine State along the border with Bangladesh. Rhoingya have been subjected to a 
campaign of ethnic cleansing since 1978, which has resulted in the flow of thousands of refugees to 
Bangladesh. They are not considered Burmese citizens, and this situation of statelessness enhances the 
vulnerability of Rhoingya women to every form of violence. In the refugee camps on the Bangladeshi 
side of the border, the existence of a trafficking network has been acknowledged: women and girl-
children as young as eight years old are sold to brothels or forcibly married. The main receiving 
country is Pakistan, but “[i]t is believed that women who are trafficked to into Pakistan may be sent 
further to Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.”219    
Trafficking in and around refugee camps is also documented in Thailand, even if it is very 
complicated to have precise figures assessing the scope of the phenomenon. Without a doubt, an 
enhancing factor is the difficulty for refugees to provide for their daily needs without leaving the 
premises of the camps, together with an increased reluctance of the Thai authorities to release permits 
to work outside the camps which thereby results in the greater vulnerability of those persons who 
decide to leave the sites illegally.
220
 
With regard to slavery-like practices, numerous reports of NGOs and international 
organizations, in particular the International Labour Organization (ILO), have highlighted the 
widespread use of forced labour in Burma. Women as well as men are forced to work as porters for the 
army or for infrastructure projects developed by the government. From the reports it is clear that the 
conditions under which forced labourers are obliged to perform their tasks are characterised by the 
denial of food, water, shelter and medicines, as well as by different forms of physical violence and, in 
the case of women and girls, sexual violence.
221
 
From the above analysis it can be inferred that, despite the official position and declarations of 
the Burmese government, women in Burma are subjected to physical violence on a widespread scale. 
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At the domestic level, this is a consequence of stereotypes regarding the social role of women in the 
community together with an unwillingness of the authorities to deal with issues that are deemed 
“private”. Physical violence is also directly perpetrated by State officials, in particular against ethnic 
women.  
 
II. Emotional and Psychological Violence 
 
According to UNHCR, under this typology of SGBV it is possible to include abuse and 
humiliation of a non-sexual nature and confinement. In the first category, acts including verbal abuse, 
compulsory engagement in humiliating acts and the denial of resources to provide for the survival of 
the family can be included; the perpetrators are usually persons in a position of power, within or 
outside the family. Confinement is the restriction of the right to free movement and the isolation from 
friends and family; in this case as well, the perpetrators are in a position of power with respect to the 
victim/survivor.
222
 
Psychological domestic violence is a difficult subject to address. The report “Gathering 
Strength”223 underlines that, even if the research does not directly deal with it, “[psychological 
violence] undoubtedly also figures in many women‟s lives”.224 
With regard to acts amounting to psychological violence perpetrated by State‟s officials, many 
independent reports provide examples of a widespread use of verbal abuse, sometimes in the form of 
death threats, in addition to the other humiliating acts committed against women by members of the 
army.
225
 Moreover, women are denied the possibility to provide for their families‟ needs by the 
constant application of the above-discussed “Four Cuts Policy,” as well as by their use as forced 
labourers. 
With regard to confinement, the legal limitations to women‟s freedom of movement have 
already been discussed; within the family, the traditional perception of a woman‟s role can result in 
limitations to the free development of social relations outside the household. Women travelling alone, 
in particular if young, are regarded as “lost women” and are often sexually harassed: “[i]t is the attitude 
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of Burmese society that women are totally different from men and they should do things under the 
supervision of guardians. [If you are travelling alone] even the people in government services would 
start asking many questions […].”226 
Overall, it is self-evident that the constant climate of fear, which is prevalent within the ethnic 
minorities in particular, amounts to psychological violence and is a clear factor determining the flight 
from the country. 
 
III. Harmful Traditional Practices 
 
Within this category, UNHCR includes Female Genital Mutilation, early or forced marriage, 
honour killing and maiming, female infanticide and denial of education for girls. Perpetrators usually 
are to be found within the family, but some of these practices are actually condoned by States both 
through legislation and omission of intervention.
227
 
With respect to Burma, it is in the first place necessary to distinguish between the different 
ethnic groups, since all of them have distinct traditions. For instance, it is difficult to compare the 
condition of Rhoingya women, whose situation is very similar to women in Muslim countries, in 
particular neighbouring Bangladesh, to the condition of women belonging to mainly Buddhist ethnic 
groups; further, many differences can be highlighted between women living in rural and urban areas of 
the country.
228
 
In principle, women in Burma are not discriminated against with regard to marriage and family 
relations: according to Buddhist customary law, the minimum age to get married is 20 years, after 
which women can decide their partner without the consent of the family. Wives are co-owners of 
family properties and in case of widowhood they have an exclusive right to the husband‟s belongings. 
Divorce is allowed for both spouses, but while female adultery is considered as a legitimate reason for 
a husband to divorce, the same principle does not apply with respect to male adultery.
229
 In many cases 
the law does not reflect the real conditions of women within marriages. With regard to early marriages 
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for example, it is not uncommon for girls in rural areas to marry whilst still teenagers;
230
 moreover, 
marriages arranged by parents are still very frequent.
231
  
Forced marriages of members of the Tatmadaw with ethnic women are very frequent and are 
clearly part of the ethnic cleansing policy of the regime. Often, these marriages are the consequence of 
rape and are arranged by authorities in order to “preserve” the survivor‟s honour. In highly militarised 
areas, marriages with members of the Tatmadaw are sometimes organized and supported by parents in 
the belief that, if the daughter marries a soldier, the abuses they are subjected to will decrease. There 
are clear accounts of the support given by army commanders to marriages of their soldiers to ethnic 
women: this support allegedly amounts to promotions decided based on the characteristics of the 
woman, in particular her education. Because Burmese children are registered under the father‟s ethnic 
group and abortion is illegal in every circumstance, forced marriage also encompasses the crime of 
forced pregnancy when they result in the birth of a child.
232
  The relation between forced marriages and 
the decision to flee from Burma is highlighted by many reports drafted based on the stories of women 
refugees in neighbouring countries, in particular Thailand. 
With regard to girls‟ education, the Burmese government declares that no differences are made 
between female and male students, since both have the same possibilities in terms of the level and 
typology of schooling.
233
 In reality, particularly within rural communities, preference is given to sons 
especially when it is necessary to move from the village of origin in order to attend secondary and 
tertiary schools. This is both a consequence of the protectiveness of the society towards girls and of the 
belief that daughters have to take on the responsibility of the household management, as it is well-
expressed by the Burmese saying “a daughter in the family is the best slave”.234 If a family cannot 
afford the expenses for the education of every child, then sons are going to have priority over their 
sisters.
235
 The reduced possibilities of studying accorded to girls contribute to increase their 
vulnerability to different forms of SGBV. 
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IV. Socio-Economic Violence 
 
Socio-economic violence consists of the discrimination against or the exclusion from the 
enjoyment of basic services or opportunities, such as access to health care, paid employment, education 
and property. According to UNHCR categorisation, socio-economic violence can be based both on 
gender and on sexual orientation; perpetrators can again be found at every level of society.
236
 
The official position of the Burmese junta is that women suffer no discrimination whatsoever in 
the enjoyment of their social and economic rights. According to the initial report in front of the 
CEDAW Committee, women and girls have equal access to education, paid employment, health care 
and sport activities.
237
 In reality, discrimination can be seen in all these areas. As stated in the Human 
Rights Yearbook of 2004 “[a]s the costs of maintaining military power and political hegemony 
continue, the Burmese government has allocated less and less money for infrastructure, healthcare and 
education.  Although this affects the majority of the civilian population in Burma, it has affected 
women in particular ways, reinforcing traditional roles of female subordination and blocking their 
access to the means through which they could change their status (such as education and politics). 
Widespread poverty disproportionately affects women […]”.238 
Instances of discrimination based on gender can be seen, for example, in the employment and 
education sectors. With regard to employment, the Initial Report states that “[…] there has been no 
discrimination between male and female […] all men and women can receive equal pay for work of 
equal value, and appropriate protective measures have already been in place.” [sic]239 Again, the real 
conditions of women workers do not reflect the government‟s declarations. Women in Burma are 
mainly employed by the agricultural sector, in particular as daily workers; in this case, for the same 
work they are paid around 100 kyat less than men.
240
 Furthermore, in the initial report it is declared that 
“[f]rom childhood, young Myanmar girls are trained to undertake work in and around the house,”241 
thus confirming the acceptance of stereotypes attached to genders. 
In the field of education, apart from the above-mentioned priority accorded to male children 
within the family, female students are openly discriminated against in the admission selection for 
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medical and engineering schools, since they are required to score higher grades than their male 
colleagues on the admission test.
242
 
The effects of the repressive policy of the junta towards ethnic groups are particularly relevant 
in demonstrating that in reality only a small part of the population fully enjoys social and economic 
rights. Since the beginning of the military regime in 1962, the Tatmadaw has carried out a draconian 
plan aimed at undermining the support of the population to the ethnic insurgents: the “Four Cuts 
Policy” clearly targets civilian villagers, challenging their possibility of providing for their most basic 
needs. Given that women are responsible for all the duties related to the management of the household, 
a policy based on forced relocation, denial of access to fields, forced labour and the imposition of taxes 
has an extraordinary impact on their livelihoods. This impact is often multiplied by the absence of male 
relatives who are obliged to escape from the villages to avoid forced labour and summary executions, 
or who are imprisoned, missing, fighting with the insurgent groups, or dead.  
Many women refugees from Burma have declared that the hard living conditions deriving from 
the junta‟s repression are one of the main factors in their decision to flee the country and look for 
refuge in neighbouring States. For instance, it is estimated that during a massive operation of relocation 
of villages which took place in the Shan State between 1996 and 1997, around 150.000 people were 
forced to migrate to Thailand.
243
 As will be analysed later, Shan are not considered by the Thai 
authorities as persons in need of temporary protection because the area they are fleeing from is a 
ceasefire zone, not an open-fight zone. Nonetheless, life in relocation sites is characterised by a lack of 
basic services and food, together with a continuous sense of vulnerability created by the proximity of 
Tatmadaw troops: “[t]he „push factors‟ or determining conditions in Burma [for migration] include 
economic instability and extreme poverty, which exist throughout the country, but are particularly 
acute in area of forced displacement and under-developed rural border regions.”244 Of course the entire 
displaced population is highly affected by the Burmese regime‟s policy towards ethnic groups, but, 
because of their social role, women are particularly exposed to the consequences of the deprivations 
deriving from relocation. One of the biggest risks to which women are subjected in relocation sites is 
sexual violence committed by members of the armed forces. The analysis of the incidence of rape and 
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other forms of sexual violence and their connection to the decision of leaving the country is the subject 
of the next section. 
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2. The Use of Rape and Sexual Violence as a Strategy of War 
 
Many reports documenting the widespread and systematic use of rape and sexual violence by 
the Tatmadaw have been issued by both local and international NGOs.
245
 The first report which 
received world-wide attention was “Licence to Rape,” drafted by the Shan Women‟s Action Network 
(SWAN) and the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) in May 2002,
246
 documenting the rape of 
several hundred girls and women in the Shan State in a nine-year period (between 1992 and 2001). 
Notwithstanding that the use of rape by the Burmese army against ethnic women was a well-known 
phenomenon before the publication of this report,
247
 the international community paid unprecedented 
attention to it, while at the same time raising doubts about its objectivity. It was in fact claimed that a 
report written by an ethnic women‟s group on the ordeal suffered by other ethnic women was likely to 
be biased and not credible.
248
 
In any case, “Licence to Rape” had the consequence of starting a movement to increase the 
international awareness of the tragedy thousands of women in Burma were going through only because 
they were ethnic minorities and female.
249
 In April 2003, another independent report on the extensive 
use of rape by the Tatmadaw was issued by an international NGO, Refugees International.
250
 “No Safe 
Place” documents the rape of 43 women of different ethnic groups, confirming the findings of “Licence 
to Rape”. Additionally, 75% of the women interviewed during its drafting declared they knew someone 
who had been raped, representing a dramatic increase in the number of victims of sexual-related 
violence in the ethnic areas of the country. 
One year after, the Karen Women‟s Organization (KWO) published “Shattering Silences”,251 
which reported the rape of more than a hundred, mainly Karen, women between 1988 and 2004. More 
recently, the Women‟s League of Burma (WLB) published “System of Impunity”,252 recording twenty-
six cases of rape which occurred in all areas inhabited by ethnic minorities between 2002 and 2004.  
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The SPDC denied the reliability of the reports, accusing the authors of operating against the 
efforts to bring democracy in the country;
253
 at the same time, it opposed the request for independent 
investigations advanced by the United Nations in the person of the former Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Burma, Professor Pinheiro.
254
 When Professor Pinheiro was finally 
allowed to visit the Shan State in August 2002, the population had been threatened in order to avoid 
any kind of accusation against the Burmese army.
255
 
The SPDC denial of the use of rape as a strategy of war and declarations about the very low 
incidence of rape and sexual violence in general are in open contradiction with the stories recorded in 
the above-listed reports which clearly demonstrate that the episodes of sexual-related violence are part 
of a plan to physically and morally undermine ethnic communities, and not the consequence of isolated 
individual actions. This view is sustained by the fact that many of the reported accidents occurred while 
women were held as prisoners or obliged to serve as porters for the Tatmadaw; in addition, a great 
number of cases were either directly perpetrated or witnessed by officials. For instance, of the 173 
incidents documented by “License to Rape”,256 85% were committed by officers;257 half of the cases 
reported in “Shattering Silences” were as well committed by high-ranking commanders.258 In some 
instances, victims/survivors were first raped by the officials and then by the soldiers under their 
command, thus emphasizing the use of sexual violence as a political strategy. In one of the stories 
related by “Shattering Silences,” the victim, a young woman belonging to the Wa ethnic group, was 
captured by a column of Tatmadaw soldiers and raped by the Commander in an army camp. After 
raping her, the Commander told his soldiers “[y]ou all must rape that woman, those who refuse to rape 
will be shot and killed.” The woman was then gang-raped by twenty soldiers and committed suicide 
upon release.
259
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The widespread use of rape and its approval by the Tatmadaw hierarchy is also confirmed by 
the testimonies of defectors who, even if they rarely admit to having committed the crime themselves, 
admit to having witnessed multiple incidents of sexual violence. Interviews with Tatmadaw defectors 
are among the sources used in the drafting of “School for Rape”,260 one of the first reports to highlight 
the high incidence of sexual-related crimes in the Burmese ethnic war. The survey underlines that the 
intrinsic nature of rape in the civil conflict is not only the consequence of peculiar aspects of the 
country, such as its high militarization, the elevated status enjoyed by members of the Tatmadaw and 
the predominant gender inequality, but it is also the result of specific characteristics of the army which 
are fostered by the highest levels of its hierarchy. Tatmadaw soldiers are generally very young and 
either illiterate or with low levels of education; they are often forcibly recruited; training and discipline 
are based on cruelty more than on the will of providing soldiers with useful skills, and foster the belief 
in the inferiority of ethnic minorities, in particular ethnic women; daily living conditions are 
characterised by an overall lack of food, equipment and health supplies, together with complete 
isolation from external society; and alcohol and drugs abuse are widespread and not sanctioned. 
Moreover, not only soldiers, but also officials are constantly harassed by superiors.
261
 These conditions, 
together with the strong emphasis put on masculinity, lead to the widespread and systematic 
commission of rape and sexual violence especially against women belonging to ethnic minorities: 
“[w]hen Tatmadaw soldiers and officers […] have the opportunity to demonstrate their masculinity, 
they take it. This means they seek to dominate and violate those in more vulnerable circumstances: 
women. Brutality breeds brutality, and the prevalence of rape by brutalized Tatmadaw soldiers and 
officers is the predictable result of the cycle of violence played out between the military and the ethnic 
insurgents.”262 
Episodes of sexual violence committed by Tatmadaw soldiers generally go unpunished. The 
social stigma attached to survivors of rape is often an insurmountable barrier which prevents victims 
from reporting incidents. In many of the recounted cases, women were scared about the reaction of 
relatives and partners and in more than one case the survivor was abandoned by the husband as a 
consequence of the sexual violence.
263
 Even when women find the courage to report the violence to 
their relatives or to the village headmen, no actions are taken to punish the culprits. On the contrary, in 
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many instances the victims and their relatives are arrested, tortured and sometimes even killed, or 
obliged to pay fines for having dishonoured a member of the Tatmadaw. Consequently, even in cases in 
which the survivor has the support of her community, the number of reports to the authorities is very 
low in order to avoid retaliations and further humiliations.
264
 In the very few cases in which the 
authorities intervene to sanction the offenders, punishments are often limited to the payment of small 
amounts of money to the survivor or, if the incident resulted in the death of the victim, to her relatives. 
A case reported in “System of Impunity” is particularly significant in this regard. The victim was an 
eight-year old Pa‟O girl who was raped by a member of the Tatmadaw while using the toilet of her 
house. When the relatives reported the case to the authorities, the “redress” they received amounted to 
“[…] 50,000 kyats (about US$50), three sets of clothes, two pounds of dried cake and a big teddy bear 
[…]”.265 As has already been pointed out,266 rapes often result in forced marriages and pregnancies. 
Sexual violence is thus clearly part of a policy of ethnic cleansing or “Burmanisation” against 
minorities.
267
 
The link between sexual violence and migration is evident in all the reports dealing with the use 
of sexual violence as a strategy of war. For example, in 13% of cases reported by “License to Rape”, 
survivors decided to move to Thailand after the incident, in some cases following the suggestion of 
relatives or village chiefs.
268
 In other cases, rapes are the consequence of migration or forced relocation 
which renders women particularly vulnerable to different forms of violations of their human rights.
269
 
Instances of rapes and other atrocities occurring during flight are very common; for example, “No Safe 
Place” contains the account of a particularly atrocious case witnessed by a woman refugee while she 
was trying to reach the border with Thailand. Whilst the woman and her family were hiding in the 
jungle, a group of Burmese soldiers caught another family on the run, they killed their newborn child 
and, “[b]efore they shot and killed him, the soldiers instructed the husband to stand and watch while 
they raped the wife and killed her by stabbing her with a bamboo stick through her vagina and 
abdomen.”270 The only survivor of the family was a six-year old girl who managed to hide from the 
soldiers.  Many of the cases recorded by the reports under analysis end with the death of the victim and 
are often committed together with other forms of torture. 
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From the above, it is clear that, despite its official declarations, the Burmese junta makes a 
widespread and systematic use of rape and other forms of sexual violence in its policy of repression of 
non-Burman ethnic groups. Actually, as noted in “System of Impunity”, the majority of cases reported 
by the research drafted by the WLB took place between 2002 and 2004, exactly during the period in 
which the SPDC was vigorously denying its use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.  
Women are raped while in their villages, houses and fields; while they are obliged to serve as 
porters or forced labourers; while detained in prisons and military camps; while forcibly relocated or on 
the run from the atrocities committed by the Tatmadaw. They are raped and tortured even when 
pregnant and the accounts of sexual violence and forced marriages of girl-children are countless. The 
reports analysed above are highly detailed, often containing the names and grades of the perpetrators. 
The exact number of victims/survivors of incidents of sexual violence is impossible to know, but it 
surely amounts to multiple thousands; the responsibility of the high ranks of the Tatmadaw, which is 
composed by the same persons ruling the country, is self-evident.  
The accounts of rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda were one of the push factors which determined the 
intervention of the international community to stop the atrocities committed against the civilian 
population: notwithstanding the accuracy of the cases of sexual violence reported in the ethnic conflict 
in Burma, no action has been taken in order to stop them, thus reinforcing the isolation of the country 
and of its population.
271
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CHAPTER 3: BURMESE FLEEING INTO THAILAND: REFUGEES 
OR ILLEGAL MIGRANTS? 
 
1. Burmese Refugees in Thailand: Some Statistical Data 
 
One of the effects of more than four decades of ethnic conflict and repression by the military 
regime in Burma is that a very high number of individuals left the country to seek refuge in bordering 
States. The highest number of Burmese refugees resides in Thailand, but all of Burma‟s neighbouring 
countries have received fluxes of people fleeing from the atrocities of the junta: in Bangladesh, the 
presence of refugees, mainly belonging to the Rhoingya ethnic group, is estimated to amount to more 
than 300.000;
272
 in India the number of Chin refugees is around 60.000; and around 35.000 refugees 
belonging to the Rhoingya and Chin ethnic groups reside in Malaysia.
273
  
It should be noted that none of these receiving countries, Thailand included, is party to the 1951 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, so that often individuals leaving areas of open conflict or subject 
to the consequences of the tough policy of repression enacted from Rangoon towards minorities and 
political opponents are considered economic illegal immigrants, and are thus at high risk of forced 
repatriation and abuse from the authorities.  
Thailand has been subjected to mass influxes of refugees from all South East Asia since the 
1970s.
274
 This is due both to its geographic position and to its political and economic stability with 
respect to its neighbouring countries. In addition, the Thai population growth rate is lower than that of 
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the rest of the area and this, particularly during periods of intense economic development, has brought 
about a need for migrant labourers.
275
 
The story of Burmese refugees‟ influxes into Thailand, as well as in the other neighbouring 
countries, is highly influenced by the developments of the civil war between Rangoon and the ethnic 
minorities. The massive flow of refugees from Burma into Thailand started in 1984. During the 1970s 
and the beginning of the 1980s, the Burmese side of the border with Thailand was under the de facto 
control of ethnic insurgents. Until 1984, the Tatmadaw started successful offensives only during the dry 
season, being obliged to withdraw from conquered positions when the monsoon season started,
276
 with 
the result that refugees would then cross the border into Thailand when the Tatmadaw was conducting 
military offensives and come back into Burma as soon as the ethnic insurgents re-established their 
control of the border areas. In 1984, the Tatmadaw was finally able to maintain the positions conquered 
during the dry season, with the resulting establishment of around 10.000 refugees in Thailand. Starting 
in 1984, the control of the Burmese army of the areas bordering with Thailand increased and, in a ten-
year period, the number of refugees grew to 80.000. In the meantime, the violent repression of the 
democratic movement in 1988 and 1990 caused the flight into Thailand of around 10.000 students and 
political opponents.
277
 When Khun Sa, one of the leaders of the resistance in the Shan State, signed a 
ceasefire agreement with the central government in 1996, the Tatmadaw had the possibility of 
controlling the entire border with Thailand for the first time, which brought about an increase in the 
number of refugees to 115.000. The struggle of the junta against ethnic insurgents, particularly in the 
Shan State, took the form of massive relocations of villages beginning in 1996. It is estimated that 
around 300.000 individuals crossed the border as a consequence of the destruction of their villages, but 
the number is not certain since the majority of displaced people belong to the Shan ethnic group, whose 
members are not recognised as refugees by the Royal Thai Government (RTG). As a consequence of 
the policy of forced relocation, the number of refugees in Thailand reached 155.000 and estimates of 
the number of IDPs in Eastern Burma range beyond 500.000.
278
 
The determination of the precise number of refugees from Burma residing in Thailand is 
complicated: as it is going to be analysed more thoroughly below, the fact that the RTG is not party to 
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the 1951 Convention creates uncertainty around the determination of refugee status; many of the 
persons who leave Burma out of a “well-founded fear of persecution” are regarded by Thai authorities 
as illegal immigrants and are thus not included in the figures on the number of refugees. 
According to the last programme report of the Thai-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC),
279
 an 
alliance of NGOs working within refugees‟ communities in the border areas, the total refugee 
population at the end of December 2005 amounted to 155.212, while the figures of the previous six 
months made amount the total refugee caseload to 157.960.
280
 As stated in the TBBC‟s report, since the 
last headcount in the refugee camps took place in 1999, this decrease in reality “[…] reflects 
adjustments for movements in and out of camps over a long period of time rather than the actual 
change in the population during this 6-month period.”281 Only in October 2005 did the RTG Ministry 
of Interior and UNHCR conclude a new registration process; moreover, since in this period the RTG 
did not allow new arrivals, it is highly possible that non-registered refugees were hiding in camps and 
that newcomers just replaced registered refugees who had left the camps for other opportunities.
282
    
Refugees in Thailand belong mainly to the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon ethnic groups; Shan 
are not allowed permanence in the refugee camps, so they are not included within the official refugee 
population. 
 
Refugee Demographics December 2005
283
 
 
 
There are nine refugee camps in the Thai-Burma border: according to the TBBC‟s programme 
report, the population of the biggest camp, Mae La in the Thai province of Tak, is 46.534.
284
 
As a consequence of the combination between the retreat of ethnic insurgents from the border 
areas, with whom refugees engaged in black market activities, and a stricter policy of the RTG which 
does not allow refugees to leave the camp premises to find jobs as daily workers or to cultivate small 
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plots of land, refugees in camps have to rely almost completely on the aid of international agencies. 
These two factors have necessitated the increase in the percentage of food supplies provided by 
international agencies to refugees from the 50% of 1984 to 100% in the mid-1990s.
285
 Since the RTG 
considers that refugees are only temporarily present in the country, building permanent structures to 
shelter them is not permitted. Houses are built of bamboo or wood and easily damaged during the rainy 
season. Besides, the RTG put restrictions on the possibility for refugees to cut or to buy bamboo, 
allegedly to reduce their environmental impact; consequently relief agencies also must provide building 
material to repair old shelters and build new ones when needed.
286
 
In general, life conditions in camps are not too different from the ones of traditional villages in 
ethnic areas of Burma, even if the prolonged character of their stay has a negative impact on the coping 
capacity of refugees;
287
 at the same time, the RTG‟s attitude towards the management of the sites is 
aimed at avoiding the so-called “pull factor”, which would render the livelihood in camps attractive for 
people fleeing from Burma.
288
 Two of the sites, Mae La Oon and Tham Hin, are in particularly 
worrisome conditions; the first was built in order to relocate the dwellers of another refugee camp 
situated close to the Salween National Park. The relocation was concluded in 2004, but around 1200 
refugees preferred to go back to Burma since the new location was only four kilometres away from the 
border, and therefore highly exposed to incursions of the Burmese army.
289
 Besides, Mae La Oon camp 
is built in an area highly susceptible to flooding.
290
 Tham Hin camp is highly overcrowded and living 
conditions are considered to be below international standards.
291
 Sadako Ogata, the former High 
Commissioner for Refugees, commented on the conditions of the camp during a visit in 2000 saying “I 
have not seen such a crowded [situation], shelter-wise very bad. I was quite shocked.”292 
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Refugees from Burma are also present in urban areas of Thailand. Urban refugees, mainly 
political opponents and Karen who do not feel safe enough in border camps, are even more exposed to 
the risk of being forcible repatriation by RTG authorities since they are reached by relief agencies with 
greater difficulty. Moreover, the RTG ordered the relocation of all urban refugees to border camps in 
2004 in an attempt to limit the activities of Burmese political opponents.
293
 The high vulnerability of 
persons seeking for refuge in Thailand depends on the RTG‟s policy towards them and will be analysed 
in the next section. 
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2. Refugees from Burma: a brief overview of the “pushing factors”  
 
The reasons why hundreds of thousands of people are leaving Burma seeking refuge in 
Thailand and other neighbouring countries may appear clear from the above analysis of the serious 
human rights violations perpetrated by the Rangoon government towards political opponents and ethnic 
minorities. Nevertheless, a brief description of the main “pushing factors” determining the flight from 
the country can be useful in order to increase the understanding of the shortcomings of and the dangers 
entailed by the RTG‟s policy toward displaced persons from Burma. 
 Since 1988, the entry of migrants from Burma into Thailand has been constantly growing with 
a partial stop after the crackdowns on undocumented immigrants at the end of the 1990s. As will be 
better analysed in the following section, most of the persons escaping from Burma who are defined as 
illegal immigrants by the RTG‟s authorities are in reality fleeing from the effects of the decade-long 
civil conflict between the central government and ethnic insurgents.  
Usually, refugees are displaced within their own country even before crossing the borders: the 
flight into Thailand usually is the consequence of the very harsh conditions characterizing internal 
displacement and is regarded as a last resort. The estimated number of IDPs in Eastern Shan State, the 
area directly bordering with Thailand, amounts to 540.000 of which around 340.000 are living in 
resettlement areas under the control of ceasefire groups. The rest is either hiding from the SPDC in 
remote areas of the country or living in the relocation sites established by the Burmese government.
294
  
From interviews conducted with Burmese living in Thailand it clearly shows that, even if the 
first reason determining the migration is usually considered to be the search for better economic 
conditions, all of them are leaving an existence characterised by abuses and human rights violations 
perpetrated by the Burmese army and government.
295
  
Forced relocation of villages has a paramount impact on the livelihood of thousands of people; 
with no land to cultivate, often the only available option is internal displacement followed by the 
crossing of the border with Thailand.
296
 Forced labour and portering are also very relevant pushing 
factors determining the flight from the country: in addition to preventing the victims from providing for 
their basic needs by cultivating their lands or performing any other kind of paid job, army porters and 
forced labourers are submitted to a long list of additional human rights violations which in many cases 
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can lead to permanent physical disabilities or death.
297
 Villagers are then often obliged to pay very high 
taxes in an economic context already characterised by a total lack of development.
298
 
 All the above-mentioned pushing factors ultimately depend on the ongoing and prolonged war 
between the junta and the ethnic factions that mainly affects the vulnerable civilian population. Apart 
from depriving villagers of the necessary means to survive, the repression policy enacted by the SPDC 
is based on the infliction of severe violations of human rights which clearly create a sense of fear and 
vulnerability within the population. Notwithstanding the numerous reports documenting these 
violations, the majority of persons fleeing from Burma are considered by the RTG as illegal immigrants 
and are highly exposed to the risk of repatriation and further human rights abuses by Thai authorities, 
employers and members of the host communities. After the abuses suffered in their home-country, 
these risks are considered bearable. As a Shan migrant declared “[t]he suffering here is not the same as 
in Burma. If an employer makes us work, he gives us the wages too. If the police catch us, he will not 
kill us and also feed us food. But in our country, we not only worked for the military, they also asked 
us for more. […] They held guns and we have only hands. […]”.299 
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3. The Royal Thai Government’s Policy towards Refugees from Burma 
 
Thailand has been a receiving country of refugee influxes since the 1970s, but it has never 
ratified either the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol; in addition, no domestic law is in place for the 
determination of refugee status. Nonetheless, the RTG has an obligation to respect the principle of non-
refoulement which can be considered as international customary law, as well as the human rights 
instruments which it has ratified since the 1990s.
300
 Notwithstanding the international obligations 
falling upon the government, the official policy toward refugees from Burma is not always based on the 
respect of basic human rights. 
The RTG‟s attitude towards refugees from Burma has been influenced by relations between the 
two countries, which,  for a long time,have been characterised by a constant tension on the border due 
to both the Tatmadaw‟s incursions into Thailand against refugees and insurgents and the trafficking of 
drugs, in particular methamphetamines, produced along the border.
301
  
Since the first Burmese incursions against the camps hosting Karen began in 1995, the RTG has 
been under pressure to deal with the security issues deriving from the presence of refugees, both in 
terms of national sovereignty and of protection of the refugees. The chaos at the border was, of course, 
unwelcome by the Thai authorities and the repatriation of refugees has been long considered the 
solution to these problems. Nonetheless, it was clear to RTG authorities that if the situation in Burma 
did not improve, refugees could not be safely repatriated.
302
 
The RTG‟s policy towards refugees from Burma changed when Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra, a charismatic former policeman and communication tycoon, took power in 2001 with a 
populist programme based on the fight against corruption and promises of economic growth.
303
 The 
attempt to improve the relations with the Burmese junta had the effect of making the RTG‟s attitude 
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toward refugees and migrant workers coming from their troubled neighbour sensibly harsher.
304
 Clear 
evidence of this change was the intolerance toward Burmese political opponents groups operating from 
Thailand, which, starting from 2003, brought about the arrest of several activists, and was subsequently 
followed by the decision to relocate all urban refugees into border camps.
305
 
The flow of refugees from Burma began in 1984 and has never stopped. In principle, the policy 
of the RTG towards persons fleeing from the SLORC/SPDC repression of democratic movements and 
ethnic groups has been to recognise them as persons in need of temporary protection on humanitarian 
grounds. This protection and the entry to the camps along the border has nonetheless been granted only 
to “persons fleeing fighting,” and not to persons fleeing from the effects of fighting or from the gross 
human rights violations inflicted by the Tatmadaw.
306
 One of the consequences of this narrow 
definition is that some ethnic groups are denied access to refugee camps and considered as illegal 
migrants, and thus face a high risk of forced repatriation.  
From this point of view, the situation of Shan refugees is particularly worrying. Since the mid-
1990s the Tatmadaw began an exceptionally intense strategy of repression targeting civilians in central 
Shan State to cut off any kind of support to the SSA troops. As has already been stated, the 
consequence of this policy was the relocation and destruction of hundreds of villages and the 
subsequent flight of hundreds of thousands of Shan into Thailand. It is estimated that around 300.000 
ethnic Shan sought refuge into their neighbouring country as a result of the severe application of the 
“Four Cut Policy”. Since the Shan have been traditionally present in Thailand as seasonal workers, the 
RTG refuses to recognise them as persons in need of temporary protection even if it is clear that they 
are fleeing from widespread and gross human rights violations. Another reason why Shan are denied 
access on humanitarian grounds is related to the high rate of drugs that are produced in the Eastern 
Shan State; it is also a consequence of the policy against drug trafficking enacted by Mr Thaksin‟s 
government. Shan are thus considered as illegal migrants with no access to refugee camps
307
 or, 
consequently, to the aid of relief agencies.
308
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People fleeing from Burma are divided by the RTG into three categories. This categorization is 
based on the “pushing factors” determining their displacement, but in reality the differences between 
the members of each group are not overly evident, considering the general environment of repression 
prevalent in Burma is the main cause of dislocation. 
As has been said, only “persons fleeing fighting” are considered “persons in need of temporary 
protection”. This category is composed mainly of ethnic Karen and Karenni who are allowed 
permanence in the nine refugee camps of the border areas. The process to determine if a person can be 
considered as “temporarily displaced” was set up only in 1998. Before the institution of the Provincial 
Admission Boards (PABs), admission to camps was based entirely on the discretion of the borders 
authorities. Nonetheless, even after the creation of a standardized screening process, instances of 
refoulement of persons refused by the PABs or not yet interviewed are numerous.
309
  
The PABs stopped meeting in 2001, with the consequent blocking of the admission process of 
new arrivals. The RTG announced that they would resume working in 2004, substituting the process 
administered by UNHCR for the determination of Person of Concern (POC) status.
310
 The role of 
UNHCR in determining the status of individual applicants as POC had, in fact, been strongly criticised 
by Prime Minister Thaksin in 2003, when some Burmese political opponents organized a 
demonstration in Bangkok to denounce an attack organized by the Tatmadaw against Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi and some of her supporters in Upper Burma.
311
 On that occasion, Mr Thaksin declared that 
UNHCR was undermining Thai sovereignty by allowing POCs to freely circulate in the country, in 
particular in the urban areas. Consequently, it was decided that no Burmese refugee was to be allowed 
in urban centres and that UNHCR had to stop the determination process. Applications could start to be 
processed again at the beginning of 2004, but the UNHCR role was limited to the referral of cases to 
the PABs.
312
 The agreement reached between the RTG and UNHCR about the re-opening of the 
determination status by the PABs also contains an enlargement of the very narrow definition employed 
in the past. Apparently the RTG agreed to also include within the category of persons in need of 
temporary protection those “fleeing from persecution or for other reasons”. However, persons falling 
within this category would have to be resettled to third countries. This development is considered by 
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UNHCR “[…] an important step towards the establishment of a national asylum structure in a non-
Convention environment”.313 
Burmese refugees in urban settings usually belong to the second category of people fleeing in 
search of refuge, that of political dissidents and students who had to leave the country after the events 
of 1988. The majority of them were allowed to go through the POC determination process of UNHCR 
and be provided with financial assistance and documents proving their status. Nonetheless, many POCs 
were, and still are, subjected to mistreatment by Thai authorities.
314
 At the beginning of the 1990s the 
RTG instituted a “safe house” in Maneeloy for Burmese political opponents were they could wait for 
resettlement into third countries; however, the majority of them preferred not to enter the centre, 
mainly because it would have been a clear admission of their participation in the democratic 
movement, with the consequent exposure of their relatives in Burma to reprisals from the junta. 
Additionally, it was feared that the creation of a centre would have made it much easier for the RTG to 
repatriate refugees as soon as the political situation made it necessary. The crackdown on Burmese 
migrants which followed the seizure of the Burmese Embassy by some students in 1999 made the life 
of POCs outside the centre even more difficult than before, determining the entry of many of them, 
especially if unregistered, into the Maneeloy centre in order to receive at least a minimum protection. 
When the centre closed in 2001, the majority of registered refugees had been resettled into third 
countries; those who entered Maneeloy without being registered allegedly returned to urban centres, 
facing again the risk of being considered illegal immigrants.
315
 
Another change in the RTG‟s policy with respect to Burmese political opponents is the 
introduction of the requirement of a visa for persons with a Burmese passport. This measure was 
introduced in 2002 and makes it very difficult for Burmese citizens to obtain the necessary documents 
to enter Thailand.
316
 
The RTG‟s decision not to allow Burmese refugees to live in urban centres causes serious 
problems in terms of safety for political dissidents, as well as for the camps population. The main 
concern is that the presence of activists in the border sites could increase the conflicts between the 
different factions fighting against the central government of Rangoon, moreover exposing all the 
refugees to attacks of the Tatmadaw across the border. Further, life in camps is extremely secluded and 
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this prevents dissidents from continuing their political activities.
317
 Even if living in urban centres, in 
particular in Bangkok, poses serious problems to refugees, and exposes them to a high risk of being 
deported back to Burma, many persons fleeing from the repression of the junta prefer to live in a urban 
environment where there are more possibilities to find jobs and have access to health care and 
education.
318
 
The last and numerically biggest category of persons crossing the border between Thailand and 
Burma is composed by “migrants”. This broad category includes people who left Burma in search of 
protection from the abuses of the Tatmadaw as well as persons looking for better economic 
opportunities. Often migrants are not only illegally residing in Thailand, they are also working in 
illegal sectors of the economy such as sex work, begging and drug trafficking. The demand for 
adolescents and female migrants, two categories which are particularly vulnerable to abuses, is 
worryingly increasing.
319
  
In the 1980s the entry of migrants from Burma and other countries in the area was welcomed by 
Thailand since the Kingdom was undergoing a period of sustained economic development and 
consequently needed unskilled and cheap labour. Thai policy towards migrant workers from Burma 
radically changed with the economic crisis of 1997, when the government decided that the work done 
by immigrants should instead go to Thai nationals. What the RTG did not take into account was that 
Thais were not available for unskilled, and therefore low paying, work. This obliged the Thai 
government to allow the registration of migrant workers, but this process was generally too expensive 
for both the employee and the employer.
320
 
In any event, the process of forced repatriation of those Burmese found without valid 
documentation sped up during the last period of the 1990s and is still going on. Deportation to Burma 
is both formal and informal and the only way to avoid it, although not always effective, is to bribe the 
Thai authorities. In reality, the difference between formal and informal deportation is almost 
imperceptible and, whatever the case may be, expulsion to Burma frequently entails the breach of the 
customary law principle of non-refoulement.  
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According to Human Rights Watch, in 2004 Thai authorities were expelling around 10.000 
Burmese migrants each month.
321
 Among the deportees, some were under the mandate of UNHCR as 
POCs.
322
 The “informal” procedures consist in the arrest by Thai authorities followed by the 
deportation to an unofficial border crossing point. In the event of an informal deportation it is easy for 
the deportee to bribe the authorities and go back to Thailand immediately after having crossed the 
border.  
After the signature of an agreement between the SPDC and the RTG in 2003, Burma became 
directly involved in the process of deportation. According to the memorandum, 400 Burmese have to 
be deported every month. After crossing the border, deportees are held in the Myawaddy centre were 
they are subjected to political screening and forced medical examinations. Since the centre is run by the 
Burmese MI, consequences for asylum seekers involved in the democratic movement can be 
particularly severe; at any rate, given that leaving the country without valid documents is a crime under 
Burmese law,
323
 all the deportees risk being detained. In some cases migrants are brought to the 
Immigration Detention Centre in Bangkok or, in cases of political activists, in the Special Detention 
Centre, prior to deportation. In both instances the only way of gaining freedom is to be deported to 
Burma, and facing the risks of being subjected to arrest by the SPDC authorities.
324
 
An important recent development to which the RTG agreed changing its previous position 
opens the way to the achievement of durable solutions for Burmese refugees: the possibility of 
resettlement to third countries.
325
 The total number of refugees who can be resettled amounts to around 
13.000 and only persons who were registered during the re-registration process of 2004-5 are allowed 
to apply. Generally speaking, the possibility of resettlement opens the opportunity of starting a new life 
to many displaced persons who sometimes lived for decades in camps; on the other hand not all 
refugees are available to leave Thailand since they still hope to return to their country.
326
 
As has been analysed, the RTG‟s policy toward refugees from Burma has been subjected to 
many changes which have made it, notwithstanding the latest positive developments, highly 
unpredictable. People fleeing from a volatile, albeit not totally unsafe, setting such as the one prevalent 
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in Burma are in need of protection from the host country as well as from the international community, a 
protection that is difficult to provide within a non-Convention environment. The risk of being forcibly 
repatriated in violation of the principle of non-refoulement to a country where abuses of human rights 
and international humanitarian law are committed on a widespread and systematic way makes the life 
of refugees in Thailand unsustainably uncertain and dangerous. As will be analysed in the next part of 
the present work, this has an outstanding negative impact on women refugees‟ livelihood in Thailand. 
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4. Sexual and Gender-based Violence against Women Refugees in 
Thailand 
 
There are approximately sixty thousand women refugees from Burma living in the nine camps 
on the Thai side of the border out of a total refugee population of around 140.000, meaning that the 
ratio of male to female is 51:49.
327
 Usually, refugees come from Burma in family units and they have a 
tendency to recreate their village community in the border sites. This suggests that the traditional 
gender roles predominant in the home-country are reproduced in displaced settings: men are the head 
of household while women are in charge of taking care of their families.
328
 
Women fleeing from Burma are very often survivors of SGBV, particularly in the form of rape 
and other sexual assaults. Unfortunately, the risk of being subjected to further abuses in the host 
country is very high, thus fostering a widespread sense of vulnerability within the female refugee 
population. Perpetrators of SGBV against women refugees from Burma “[…] include Thai soldiers, 
officials and villagers but most are fellow refugees”.329 Girls are the main target since they are 
perceived as more vulnerable and unable to advance complaints to receive a redress for the violence 
they are subjected to. The lack of reporting is a common characteristic of episodes of SGBV 
disregarding the age of the survivor and is a consequence of a strict patriarchal society which faults the 
victims for the violence done to them. The social stigma attached to cases of rape for instance often has 
the consequence of obliging the survivor to marry the rapist in order to preserve her honour and the 
honour of her family.
330
 The low rate of reported cases does not depend too much on the provenance of 
the perpetrator: when the culprit is one of the Thai authorities, complaints are uncommon for fear for 
retaliation; but when the perpetrator is someone belonging to the same community as the survivor, 
reports are even less common since the victim does not want to put her fellow refugees in danger in an 
environment already perceived as unsympathetic.
331
 
As has been pointed out above, SGBV is both a reason determining flight and a consequence of 
displacement. Out of fear of suffering violence again, hundreds of thousands of women leave Burma 
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after having been subjected to sexual violence and other severe violations of their rights; while on the 
run, women are particularly vulnerable to further episodes of SGBV at the hand of Thai border 
authorities in particular in the form of opportunistic rape and trafficking. When the perpetrator is an 
official the possibility of receiving redress is very low. Accounts of rape of women whilst crossing the 
border with Thailand or being forcibly repatriated are countless. A case which received attention from 
the Thai media can serve as an example of the ordeal to which thousands of women and girls fleeing 
from Burma are subjected. During the RTG‟s crackdown against migrants in November 1999, Burmese 
workers were denied entry into the country and sent back to the Burmese side of the border. During one 
of these operations, fifteen women were raped by Tatmadaw soldiers. In the same period, several 
accounts of rape by Thai Border Patrol Police of women trying to enter Thailand were reported.
332
   
Inside the camps, women remain at high risk of sexual violence perpetrated by the very persons 
who should be protecting them. In some of the interviews made for the drafting of “Gathering 
Strength”, women refugees expressed the feeling that Thai men do not respect them as much as they do 
with women belonging to their community, thus adding a racial character to SGBV.
333
 Instances of 
sexual violence against women refugees working outside the camps are very common as well. In these 
cases the perpetrators usually are the employers.
334
 
With regard to the way male leaders in camps address instances of SGBV, it can be said that 
their reaction is generally of indifference. When the perpetrator is a member of the refugee community, 
camps leaders prefer not to involve Thai authorities and try to arrange reparation with the survivor‟s 
family. On the other hand, Thai authorities prefer not to get involved in cases taking place within 
refugee communities, leaving the justice system of the camps, which is often arbitrary, to make its own 
way.
335
 
Following a pattern common to refugee settings all over the world,
336
 within refugee, internally 
displaced or relocated populations in Thailand the incidence of domestic violence increases. Women 
expressed the opinion that “[…] the incidence of domestic violence was sometimes higher in refugee 
camps than in their former communities […]”,337 highlighting the alienation of husbands and the 
consequent increase in alcohol and drug abuse as factors influencing this rise. Women refugees also 
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expressed the opinion that the inclusion of men in projects addressing domestic violence is of 
paramount importance in order to reduce its incidence in the camps.
338
 
Women‟s organizations play a prominent role in trying to increase the prevention and response 
to cases of SGBV within the camps. In the first place, being part of the community, it is easier for 
survivors to trust them; secondly, UNHCR is not allowed by the Thai government to have a constant 
presence in the camps, so that its ability to enact effective programmes based on its policy and 
guidelines on SGBV is seriously undermined. Nonetheless, since 2002 UNHCR Thailand has started to 
implement programmes aimed at reducing the impact of SGBV by raising awareness within refugee 
communities and Thai authorities and setting up response mechanisms coherent with international 
standards, thus remedying to lack of specific SGBV programmes, a problem which had been 
underlined, for instance, by the WCRWC in a 2001 report.
339
 Part of these programmes is based on the 
creation of committees composed by both male and female refugees whose role is to report SGBV 
cases to UNHCR and refer survivors to medical and counselling services. The importance of the 
independence of these committees is self-evident since male camp leaders do not show the necessary 
sensitivity to address SGBV incidents;
340
 further, women are still underrepresented in refugees‟ 
decision-making bodies, constituting only 22% and 10% of, respectively, Camps Committees and 
Section Committees,
341
 a lack of representation that clearly influences the possibility of mainstreaming 
gender related issues into the management of the camps. 
A particularly important role is plaid by the Mae Tao clinic situated in Mae Sot area. The clinic 
was opened by a Karen woman who fled with hundreds of other people after the 1988 events. Dr. 
Cynthia Maung started operating with the help of a few volunteers and is now the director of a clinic 
serving approximately 200.000 persons on both sides of the border. In addition to providing health 
services, the Mae Tao clinic also runs a primary school and a boarding school for orphans, organizes 
trainings for health workers and traditional birth attendants and affords support to the activities of 
ethnic women‟s associations working with refugees. The role of the Mae Tao clinic with respect to the 
wellbeing of women refugees and migrant workers from Burma in the area of Mae Sot is of 
outstanding importance, in particular with regard to the reproductive health services it provides.
342
 
Unfortunately, the Mae Tao clinic also suffered from the increasingly strict policy of the RTG toward 
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Burmese migrants when in 2003 Dr. Cynthia Maung was informed that the Burmese working in the 
clinic would not be able to renew their work permits.
343
  
In 2005 UNHCR used Thailand as a pilot project for its Age, Gender and Diversity 
Mainstreaming process.
344
 One of the outcomes of the year-long implementation was the institution of 
Multi Functional Teams aimed at interacting with the different sectors of the refugee communities to 
elaborate projects responding to their most pressing needs.
345
 A very important development introduced 
by UNHCR during the re-registration process of 2005 was the individual registration of women 
refugees, which is one of the main instruments to ensure women‟s access to aid and documentation. 
With regard to the distribution of relief items, in particular sanitary supplies, women‟s refugees 
committees have been entrusted with the process of the identification of beneficiaries and management 
systems.
346
 
With regard to the general livelihood of women refugees in camps, the prohibition for sites-
dwellers to leave the camp premises in order to increase the income of their families has a very high 
impact on women‟s lives. If women are found out of the camps without authorization they risk the 
repatriation to Burma; at the same time, women are preferred to men by factories owners and for 
domestic work. Women working outside the camps are extremely vulnerable to abuses by employers 
and Thai authorities, and highly exposed to the risk of being trafficked or employed in exploitative 
jobs.
347
 In addition to the risks women can encounter if working outside the camps, the refugee 
community itself reveals prejudices against them based on the assumption that they have been involved 
in sex work. In general, when women are subjected to SGBV while outside the compounds, the 
community considers it as a natural consequence of having left the safe environment of the camps.
348
 
The problem of enabling women to earn some money in the secluded camp environment is 
addressed by women‟s organizations with the delivery of vocational training mainly aimed at the 
production and selling of traditional handicraft. This, for instance, is one of the activities implemented 
by WEAVE, an NGO active in refugee camps at the border with Thailand.
349
 
 The importance of these activities has been recently acknowledged by the RTG as a way of 
reducing the impact of the protracted camp situation which has had the consequence of seriously 
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undermining the psychological wellbeing of the community. One of the effects of this situation directly 
affecting women is the increase in cases of domestic violence. Moreover, malnutrition in camps 
reached worryingly high levels due to the poorness of the diet and the impossibility for refugees to buy 
additional food without earning a salary. UNHCR considers this new position of the Thai government 
as a very important step to better the livelihood of refugees in the border camps.
350
   
At present it is impossible to evaluate the impact of these projects established by UNHCR and 
other organizations for women refugees in Thailand. The new standpoint of the RTG towards 
resettlement and refugees‟ rights could have important consequences on women searching for refuge 
from the violent repression they suffer in Burma. At the same time, Thailand should access the 1951 
Convention and its Protocol in order to enact a refugee policy within an international framework. 
Moreover, SGBV should be considered as a ground to grant asylum to survivors. Not only would this 
increase the level of protection accorded to women refugees, it would also contribute to cast a light on 
the widespread and systematic violations of their rights perpetrated in a climate of total impunity by the 
Burmese army.  
When the SPDC delegation at the CEDAW Committee was asked about the conditions of 
women refugees, the answer was “[t]here are actually no refugee camps on our side”.351 The Burmese 
junta‟s continuous denial of the allegations of violations of women‟s rights that have been analysed in 
the present work based on detailed reports drafted by both international and local NGOs is nothing but 
propaganda. Ultimately, the only way to really improve the conditions of women refugees from Burma 
is the development of a genuine democratic system within their country, together with the elaboration 
of a consistent strategy aimed at overcoming the gender stereotypes which undermine women‟s 
freedom and possibility of development.  
The international community shares the responsibility of protecting refugees with the host 
country, in this case Thailand. At the same time, it also has the responsibility of sustaining the struggle 
of the people of Burma to bring their government back to democracy after decades of military rule. 
Unfortunately, the situation of Burma is not part of the agenda of the United Nations Security Council 
and so far the sanctions that some States have applied to the regime have failed to contribute to an 
improvement in the livelihood of the population of the South Eastern Asian country. Political and 
economic interests still play a major role in the attitude of the international community towards one of 
the worst dictatorships of the world: in the meantime, the women of Burma suffer countless violations 
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of their basic rights with an almost total lack of interest from the community of States. Ultimately, 
everyone is responsible for their sufferings. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
“The only real prison is fear, and the only real freedom is freedom from fear” 
-Daw Aung San Suu Kyi- 
 
Notwithstanding the position sustained by the Burmese government, women in Burma do not 
enjoy their basic rights and gender equality is still far from having been achieved. As has been 
demonstrated, the policy of the junta not only fails to contribute to the enhancement of women‟s 
position in society, but, on the contrary, it perpetuates stereotypes of the traditional role of women in 
the family and society. 
This unbalanced relation between genders is, of course, exacerbated by the situation of ongoing 
ethnic conflict characterising more than half of the country. Even in ceasefire areas the massive 
presence of Tatmadaw troops creates unbearable living conditions for the civil population, in particular 
as a consequence of the application of the “Four Cuts Policy” which directly targets villagers of ethnic 
areas who are forcibly relocated from their homes, used as forced labourers, denied access to the most 
basic services, tortured, killed and, in general, subjected to intolerable levels of psychological violence. 
One of the consequences of this policy is the massive internal and cross-border displacement of 
civilians left with no other option in order to survive. 
The Burmese government is party to the Four Geneva Conventions of which Common Article 3 
imposes the prohibition of inhumane treatment of civilians during non-international conflicts.
352
 Within 
the acts prohibited by Common Article 3, particularly relevant with regard to women is the ruling out 
of acts amounting to torture and cruel treatment and of outrages upon personal dignity. Rangoon is also 
party to the Convention on the Elimination of Every Form of Discrimination Against Women and to 
the Convention on the Right of the Child,
353
 in addition to being obliged to respect the norms of 
customary international law, of which the prohibition of inhumane treatments and slavery are a 
fundamental element. The prohibition of the well-known and widespread slavery-like practices in 
Burma is further supported by the ratification by the military junta of the ILO Forced Labour 
Convention of 1930.
354
 
Ethnic women are subjected to violations of their basic rights both because of their gender and 
because of their race. The reports analysed above show that SGBV against women is both widespread 
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and systematic, thus amounting to a crime against humanity.
355
 Furthermore, the high incidence of 
violence against women perpetrated by States officials clearly amounts to persecution in the sense of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.      
None of the States bordering Burma is party to the 1951 Convention, a factor that makes the life 
of people seeking refuge from the repression of the Burmese junta extremely uncertain. In the case of 
women refugees this means that often they are not only not granted the necessary protection and 
assistance deriving from being obliged to leave their home-country upon persecution and being 
survivors/victims of SGBV, they are also very often submitted to further violence by the host State 
authorities and community, as well as their own community. The risks of being subjected to sexual 
violence, domestic violence, harmful traditional practices and trafficking always increase as a 
consequence of displacement, but the likeliness for women to be exposed to these different forms of 
SGBV is further boosted in non-Convention environments. 
The case of Thailand is exemplary of the treatment to which Burmese refugees are subjected; 
the RTG‟s policy towards people fleeing from the atrocities of the Tatmadaw in fact is highly volatile 
and based more on political calculations than on humanitarian grounds. As has been seen, the RTG 
considers only persons that are fleeing from areas of open conflict as being in need of temporary 
protection: this excludes those persons who are leaving Burma because of the massive human rights 
violations committed by the Tatmadaw in areas which are under ceasefire agreements from the access 
to refugee camps and protection. They are considered to be illegal immigrants and hence are highly 
exposed to forced repatriation. This is the case, for instance, of the ethnic Shan, one of the groups that 
have suffered the most as a consequence of the high number of villages forcibly relocated and 
destroyed as part of the strategy of ethnic cleansing enacted by the Tatmadaw. Women from Burma 
who are found without legal documents are at particularly high risk of being subjected to SGBV by 
Thai authorities and, if forcibly repatriated, by the Burmese troops.  
Even if Thailand is not party to the 1951 Convention, it is still obliged to respect customary 
international law. With regard to international refugee law, the RTG is bound to follow one of its main 
principles, establishing the non-refoulement of persons at risk of being subjected to persecution upon 
repatriation to their home country.
356
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documents by UNHCR attesting their status. This practice is openly in contrast with customary 
international law and should be sanctioned by the international community.  
As has been analysed above, UNHCR is implementing projects aimed at diminishing the 
incidence of SGBV within refugee communities in Thailand in particular from 2002. Since the 
prevention of violence against women is strictly connected to a change in the attitude of the population 
toward the social roles attached to genders an evaluation of their impact remains for the time being 
premature. Nonetheless, the fact that UNHCR is not allowed to have a constant presence in the camps 
threatens to undermine their effectiveness.  
Notwithstanding the developments in the RTG‟s policy with respect to refugees from Burma, its 
access to the 1951 Convention undoubtedly would better the livelihood of the hundreds of thousands of 
people who have been obliged to leave their home country because of the open persecution perpetrated 
by the Burmese army. Moreover, Thailand should apply a wider criteria to define persons in need of 
temporary protection.  
With regard to Burma, the only possible solution to decades of civil conflict is the hand over of 
the political power to the recognised leader of the democratic movement and winner of the Nobel Peace 
Prize, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The institution of a true democracy and the establishment of effective 
policies aimed at enhancing the role of women within Burmese society are the only elements which 
could really contribute to a decrease in the incidence of SGBV in this Asian country.  
Ultimately, the international community should take a clear position with respect to the military 
junta in Burma, disregarding the economic and political considerations which are silencing the 
legitimate claims of hundreds of thousands of women victims of atrocious and well-documented 
violations of their most basic human rights.  
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ANNEX 1: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF REFUGEE STATUS 
 
 
As has been analysed in Chapter 3, one of the problems affecting women refugees derives from 
the absence of references to gender as a possible ground for persecution in the terms expressed by the 
1951 Convention. Moreover, often women arriving in the country of asylum with their male relatives 
are interviewed only summarily or not at all for the determination of their status, showing a biased 
approach of officials to link persecution to political activities and consequently to men. Further, when 
interviewed, women may be subjected to non-gender sensitive procedures, which can seriously affect 
the likeliness of them entirely reporting their experience, in particular when the persecution they 
suffered took the form of rape or other sexual assaults.
357
 
In its 1985 Conclusion on Women Refugees and International Protection, UNHCR‟s Executive 
Committee “[r]ecognized that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the 
interpretation that women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhumane treatment due to their having 
transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a „particular social 
group‟ within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.”358   
Among the Conclusions issued by the Executive Committee on the subject of gender-based 
persecution, particularly important is the 1993 Conclusion on Refugee Protection and Sexual 
Violence
359
 in which the Committee “[s]trongly condemns persecution through sexual violence, which 
not only constitutes a gross violation of human rights, as well as, when committed in the context of 
armed conflict, a grave breach of humanitarian law, but is also a particularly serious offence to human 
dignity,”360 urging States to grant equal access to refugee men and women to the procedures of status 
determination and to the issue of personal documents,
361
 as well as to develop “[…] appropriate 
guidelines on women asylum-seekers, in recognition of the fact that women refugees often experience 
persecution differently from refugee men.”362 
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In 2002, UNHCR issued the “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related 
Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees”,363 which were included in the SGBV Guidelines released one year 
after by the agency. The aim of this document was to “[…] provide legal interpretative guidance for 
governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary, as well as UNHCR staff carrying 
out refugee status determination in the field.”364 The Gender-Related Persecution Guidelines recognise 
that a gender-sensitive approach to refugee status determination is relatively recent and its development 
has been influenced by the parallel development of human rights law, together with the jurisprudence 
of international criminal courts. It is further noted that it is not sufficient to be a woman to be entitled to 
refugee status since “[…] the refugee claimant must establish that he or she has a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”365 According to these guidelines then, claims of refugee status for gender-based 
persecution always must be linked to the five grounds listed by Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, 
which, if interpreted properly, also cover cases of persecution based on the gender of the claimant.
366
 
Apart from a detailed analysis of the elements that must be taken into account while considering claims 
based on gender-related persecution, such as the difference between mere discrimination and 
persecution and the gender-sensitive interpretation of the Convention grounds of persecution, the 
Gender-Related Persecution Guidelines list also some procedural arrangements that should be applied 
in order to create an adequate environment for the claimant to describe his or her conditions, taking into 
account that often survivors of SGBV, in particular women, can feel uncomfortable in speaking about 
their experience or can suffer from Post-Traumatic Syndrome Disorder.
367
 
At the municipal level, some countries began adopting guidelines on gender-related persecution 
in the 1990s. One of the first countries to move in the direction indicated by UNHCR was Canada after 
the public opinion movement arising as a consequence of the Immigration and Refugee Board‟s 
sentence in the Nada case. The case was related to the application for asylum of a Saudi Arabian 
                                                 
363
 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter Gender-Related Persecution 
Guidelines), May 2002, in “International Journal of Refugee Law”, vol 14, No. 2/3, 2002. 
364
 Ibidem, p. 457. 
365
 Ibidem, p. 459. 
366
 Ibidem; it is further noticed that “[...] there is no need to add an additional ground to the 1951 Convention definition” 
related to gender, ibidem, p. 460. Even if it is beyond doubt that a gender-sensitive approach to the 1951 Convention can 
grant the determination of refugee status on grounds of gender-based persecution, the explicit inclusion of “gender” in 
Article 1A(2) would have an important symbolic, as well as legal, value; the effect could be the same as the inclusion of 
sexual crimes within crimes against humanity in the Statute of the International Criminal Court which underlined the 
commitment of the international community not to accept the perpetuation of those crimes. 
367
 Ibidem, pp. 467-470. 
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woman who feared persecution for her denial to comply with the imposed behavioural codes in her 
country of origin: the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) refused her application stating that, to 
avoid being subjected to persecution, she simply had to respect the law. The sentence fostered a strong 
public opinion movement which had the effects of granting Nada permanent residence for humanitarian 
reasons and pushing the IRB to adopt the Gender Guidelines in March 1993.
368
 These guidelines, 
updated three years later to take into account the evolution based on case law, did not represent a 
change in Canadian asylum policy, but they provided a framework to assess claims put forward by 
women independently by their male relatives, as well as established gender-sensitive procedures of 
assessment.
369
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ANNEX 2: MAP OF BURMA 
 
 
Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Session, at 
www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/Myanmar.pdf 
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ANNEX 3: MAJOR ETHNIC GROUPS OF BURMA 
 
Source: Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Programme Report: July to December 
2005, p. 9, at www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/TBBCreport_Jul-Dec2005.pdf 
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ANNEX 4: THAI-BURMA BORDER, REFUGEE POPULATION BY 
GENDER, MAY 2005 
 
 
Source: UNHCR, Myanmar Thailand Border, Refugee Population by Gender as at the end of March 2006, at 
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3da150087 
 100 
ANNEX 5: BURMESE BORDER REFUGEE SITES WITH 
POPULATION FIGURES, DECEMBER 2005 
 
Source: Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Programme Report: July to December 
2005, p. 13, at www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/TBBCreport_Jul-Dec2005.pdf 
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ANNEX 6: HISTORY OF THE BURMESE BORDER SITUATION, 
1984-2005 
 
 
Source: Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, Programme Report: July to December 
2005, p. 75, at www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/TBBCreport_Jul-Dec2005.pdf 
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ANNEX 7: LIST OF CEASEFIRES GROUPS 
Main Cease-fire Organisations (in order of agreement) 
No Name of organisation Abb: Leader Date Region 
1 
Myanmar National Democracy 
Alliance Army (Kokang) 
MNDAA 
Phone Kyar 
Shin 
21 Mar 
1989 
Special Region-1, Northern 
Shan State 
2 
United Wa State Army 
(Myanmar National Solidarity 
Party) 
UWSA 
Pao Yuchang 
& Kyauk Nyi 
Lai 
9 May 
1989  
Special Region-2, Shan 
State 
3 
National Democratic Alliance 
Army (Shan/Akha Armed 
National Groups) 
NDAA 
Sai Lin & Lin 
Ming Xian 
30 
June 
1989 
Special Region-4, Eastern 
Shan State  
4 
Shan State Army (Shan State 
Progress Party) 
SSA Col. Loi Mao 
2 Sept 
1989 
Special Region-3, Shan 
State 
5 New Democratic Army (Kachin) NDA-K 
Sakhone Ting 
Ying 
15 Dec 
1989 
Special Region-1, North-
East Kachin State 
6 
Kachin Defence Army (KIO 4th 
Brigade) 
KDA Mahtu Naw 
13 Jan 
1991 
Special Region-5, Northern 
Shan State 
7 Pa-O National Organisation PNO 
Aung Kham 
Hti 
11 
April 
1991 
Special Region-6, Southern 
Shan State 
8 Palaung State Liberation Army PSLA Aik Mone 
21 
April 
1991 
Special Region-7, Northern 
Shan State 
9 
Kayan National Guard 
(breakaway group from KNLP) 
KNG 
Gabriel Byan 
& Htay Ko 
27 Feb 
1992 
Special Region-1, 
Kayah(Karenni) State 
10 
Kachin Independence 
Organization 
KIO Lamung Tu Jai 
1 Oct 
1993 
Special Region-2, Kachin 
State 
11 
Karenni State Nationalities 
Peoples' Liberation Front 
KNPLF 
Sandar & 
Htun Kyaw 
9 May 
1994 
Special Region-2, 
Kayah(Karenni) State 
12 Kayan New Land Party KNLP Shwe Aye 
26 July 
1994 
Special Region-3, 
Kayah(Karenni) State 
13 
Shan State Nationalities 
Peoples' Liberation Organization 
SSNPLO Ta Kalei  
9 Oct 
1994 
Southern Shan State 
14 New Mon State Party NMSP Nai Shwe Kyin 
29 
June 
1995 
Mon State 
 
Other Cease-fire Forces (not always announced or listed by government) 
No Name of organisation Abb: Leader Date Region 
1 
Democratic Karen Buddhist 
Army 
DKBA 
Tha Htoo 
Kyaw 
Dec 
1994 
Karen State  
2 
Shan State National Army, aka 
SSA-Central  
SSNA Gun Yawd  1995 Nothern Shan State 
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3 Mong Tai Army MTA Khun Sa  
2 Jan 
1996 
Souhtern Shan State 
4 
Karenni National Defence Army 
(splinter faction from KNPP) 
N/A Lee Rey  1996 Kayah(Karenni) State 
5 
Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 
16th Battalion) 
N/A 
Saw Tha Mu 
Hei 
24 Feb 
1997 
Karen State  
6 
Rakhine State All National Races 
Solidarity Party (CPB Arakan 
State) 
N/A Saw Tun Oo  
6 April 
1997 
Arakan(Rakhine) State  
7 
Mon Mergui Army (splinter 
faction from NMSP) 
N/A 
Ong Suik 
Heang 
1997 N/A 
8 
KNU Special Region group 
(Toungoo) 
N/A 
Saw Farrey 
Moe  
8 Nov 
1997 
Karen State  
 
Source: “The Irrawaddy”, at www.irrawaddy.org/res/ceasefire.html  
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